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Abstract

The Department of Defense‘s space acquisition enterprise has experienced
numerous challenges since the advent of space power. Space borne capabilities are
needed now more than ever, but space acquisition programs frequently fail to meet cost
and schedule goals. The decades of space acquisition experience form a rich history that
can be used to build a leading indicator of program success and serve as an enabler
toward effective program execution. First, the space acquisition areas of greatest concern
were determined to be cost, schedule and requirements. These areas can be considered as
systems that are composed of the people, processes and products that work together to
execute the program. Their effective interoperation is vital toward achieving program
success. Second, the vital interoperation characteristics, or attributes that each system
must possess to be successful, can be extracted from past space acquisition lessons
learned and placed into an interoperability maturity model. The maturity model can then
be used to capture the relative maturity of the program‘s major systems and their ability
to interoperate within the context of each critical characteristic. Third, the maturity
model forms the basis for an interoperability measurement using the method developed
by Dr. Thomas Ford, where higher levels of interoperability maturity will result in a
higher interoperability score. Finally, this process is demonstrated with three recent
space programs. This application demonstrates how the interoperability score can be
used as a leading indicator with interpretive analysis provided.
iv
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A SPACE ACQUISITION LEADING INDICATOR
BASED ON SYSTEM INTEROPERATION MATURITY
I. Introduction
The U.S. Army is one of the largest users of space-based capabilities in DOD. As the
Army transforms, its operational characteristics will, in large part, be achieved through
the use and exploitation of transformational space systems. This dependency requires the
Army to actively participate in defining space related capability needs that ensure
necessary force structure and systems are developed and acquired to enable the land
force to conduct the full range of military operations now and in the future.
—Army Space Policy (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009)

Background
There is little doubt that the tenets of network centric warfare provide military
forces a decided advantage on the battlefield. Robustly networked forces share
information and collaborate resulting in synchronized battlespace effects, greater speed of
command, and increased lethality, survivability and responsiveness (Department of
Defense, 2001). The ability to connect and interoperate between people and forces is a
necessary condition toward enabling mission effectiveness in virtually any collaborative
environment, including acquisition.
Interoperability has grown within the defense community from a buzzword to a
mandatory system requirement. Despite its importance, the study of interoperability
measurement has been disparate and remains largely unproven. Most interoperability
measurement methods focus on qualitative means rather than quantitative, and no one
method has been accepted as the de facto standard. In 2007, there were over 30 distinct
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definitions, over 60 types and at least 14 interoperability measurement models in
existence (Ford, Colombi, Graham, & Jacques, 2007).
The Department of Defense‘s (DOD) approach to interoperability is manifested in
the Net-Ready Key Performance Parameter (NR-KPP) and requires that joint systems
adhere to compliant solution architectures, the Net-Centric Data and Services Strategy,
technical standards and interfaces through the Global Information Grid (GIG) Technical
Guidance, DOD Information Assurance (IA) requirements, and DOD supportability
requirements (CJCSI, 2008). The NR-KPP provides a framework and data strategy to
enable interoperability, but does not specify how to measure interoperability nor does it
establish interoperability performance standards.
Similarly, the DOD‘s space acquisition community does not have a way to
quantifiably measure the effectiveness of its acquisition programs‘ interoperations. It
generally uses a series of gates and reviews that demand various levels of program
maturity and rigor. These gates and reviews enforce good acquisition discipline and, in
theory, provide the program with the best chance to deliver capability to the warfighter in
a time confident manner. Although the term interoperability may seem foreign when
viewed from within the acquisition process, the major forces that affect the outcome of an
acquisition program; organizations/people, processes, information and systems, must
indeed be interoperable with one another and aligned toward a common purpose.
Major Thomas Ford‘s seminal work supplied the first quantifiable method for
interoperability measurement (Ford, 2008), and formed the initial links between
interoperability measurement and operational mission effectiveness. He introduced the
2

concept of ―
confrontational interoperability‖ where interoperability is measured between
two opposing systems, and where one system‘s ability to control the other results in a
higher degree of operational mission effectiveness.
This thesis is founded on Ford‘s inaugural work, and extends his ideas further into
the realm of collaborative interoperability within the context of space acquisition. As
implied by the opening quote, there is a distinct tie between the ability to interoperate and
operational mission effectiveness. This paper asserts that the same relationships exist
within an acquisition program, where greater acquisition interoperability results in an
increased ability to meet requirements on time and on schedule. A method to measure
space acquisition interoperability is presented and provides the initial building blocks
toward a quantifiable means to assess and even predict space acquisition performance.
Hypotheses/Research Objectives
The lessons learned from past space acquisition failures can be used to determine
how a program‘s cost, schedule and requirements interoperate to produce a particular
outcome. These relationships and characteristics can be extracted, placed into a maturity
model, and then evaluated using Ford‘s interoperability measurement method to create an
indicator of effective acquisition interoperation. This measurement method can then be
applied to current and future acquisition programs to indicate or predict to what degree
the components of a program interoperate. The measure incorporates the benefit of
hindsight to determine whether or not the program is likely to achieve its requirements on
time and on schedule based upon its individual components‘ ability to interoperate.
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Methodology
The research method first examines past space acquisition failures for key factors
or characters that dominated the program‘s eventual outcome. These failures can then be
used to compose an acquisition maturity model founded upon earlier works such as the
Levels of Information Systems Interoperability (LISI) model and the Organizational
Interoperability Maturity Model (OIM).
Finally, a measure of acquisition effectiveness will be developed and applied
using Ford‘s work and the aforementioned acquisition maturity model.
Assumptions/Limitations
The intent of this work is to determine the crucial acquisition characteristics that
should be specifically considered when measuring acquisition interoperability. These
characteristics will be developed based on past lessons learned, and will be subjective in
nature. The measurement will reward a greater maturity level in a key characteristic, but
cannot explain exactly how much was gained because of it. For instance, an acquisition
failure may be caused by funding instability, but no quantifiable method exists to
determine exactly how much the schedule, cost and performance were impacted.
Additionally, Ford‘s work described how the need for interoperability varies with
time. A thorough examination of the time-dependencies of acquisition interoperability is
not presented here but is a good candidate for future research.
Lastly, this thesis will only examine interoperability within the specific context of
space acquisition. It is likely that the ideas presented in this paper are relevant to other
contexts; however those aspects will not be addressed here. It is believed that these vital
4

interoperability aspects at their core are universal and are necessary factors to enable
collaborative interoperability between systems and forces. Therefore, the lessons learned
from the space acquisition domain could serve as relevant factors for interoperability in
any domain at their highest level of extraction.
Implications
The space acquisition maturity model and acquisition interoperability
measurement supply an initial approach to quantify whether or not a space program will
be effective. In other words, the measurement can help predict how likely the program
will succeed in accomplishing the required level of performance within cost and schedule
constraints – a leading indicator. This method could be used to evaluate a program‘s
maturity and progress throughout its lifecycle, and potentially flag program risk areas
before they are realized.
Preview
The literature review will provide background essential to understanding Ford‘s
interoperability measurement method, interoperability maturity models, and how the
models can be used to facilitate interoperability measurements. An examination of the
key areas (systems) involved in and driving causes of space acquisition failures follows.
The methodology section fuses the concepts and information from the literature
review to demonstrate a method to measure space acquisition interoperability. An
acquisition interoperability maturity model will be built based upon the key and driving
causes of space acquisition failures.
5

In the analysis and results chapter, the space acquisition maturity model will be
used to measure the interoperability of several space programs by means of Ford‘s
interoperability measurement method and will discuss the use of the measurements as a
leading indicator of space acquisition effectiveness.
The conclusions and recommendations section will examine the results of the
aforementioned interoperability measure as a leading indicator and will discuss the utility
of a leading indicator with respect to ongoing and future space programs. Suggestions
for future research and maturation of the leading indicator will follow.
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II. Literature Review
“…a process and procedure for establishing goals for improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of government agencies operations and the
ability to deliver goods and services to the public using Information
Technology. The goals must be measurable.”

—Clinger Cohen Act, Public Law 104-106

Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary of Ford‘s method,
interoperability maturity models, and past space acquisition failures and their root causes.
This literature review lays the foundation for the development of an acquisition
effectiveness maturity model and later, a quantifiable method for measuring space
acquisition interoperability. A review of leading indicators for DOD acquisition
programs will also be discussed to validate the utility of the interoperability
measurement.
The literature review first provides a brief summary of the foundational works
that this paper relies and builds upon. The basic tenets of Ford‘s interoperability
measurement method and the interoperability maturity models are essential knowledge to
understand the concepts and applications presented in this thesis. A summary of past
space acquisition failures follows. Various sources were used to identify the root causes
of the space acquisition failures of the past, and these root causes will later serve as chief
contributors to an acquisition interoperability maturity model in the methodology section
of this paper.

7

Before beginning, it is critically important that a standard definition of the term
interoperability‖ is provided. Ford‘s paper, the 2007 survey on interoperability
―
measurement, LISI and OIM chose to use the DOD‘s original definition from Joint
Publication 1-02 (Department of Defense, 2005) as the standard. It states that
interoperability is ―theability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and
accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged
to enable them to operate effectively together‖ (Ford, Colombi, Graham, & Jacques,
2007). This thesis will remain consistent with this definition.
Ford’s Interoperability Measurement Method
Ford created a method to measure confrontational interoperability based on and
constrained by an operational scenario and the systems and processes that execute the
activities contained in the scenario. Ford‘s basic process to define the interoperability
measurement can be described by the figure below, taken from Ford‘s earlier work:
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Figure 1. Interoperability Measurement Process (Ford, 2008)
The first step in Ford‘s interoperability measurement process is to define the
purpose of the measurement. Defining the purpose is necessary to adequately scope the
interoperability measurement, and serves as the anchor for the interoperability analysis.
Once the purpose has been determined, the process that serves or is the subject of the
purpose must be developed. In Ford‘s method and this paper, operational scenarios
defined the process for analysis. In this paper, acquisition programs will provide the
processes for analysis.
According to Defense Acquisition University, Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)
are ―
a measure of operational success that must be closely related to the objective of the
mission or operation being evaluated. For example, the number of enemy submarines
sunk or enemy tanks destroyed may be satisfactory MOEs if the objective is to destroy
9

such weapons systems...A meaningful MOE must be quantifiable and a measure to what
degree the real objective is achieved.‖ Ford‘s work was chiefly focused on
confrontational interoperability which used MOEs based on the effectiveness of friendly,
or ―
blue‖ forces compared against the effectiveness of enemy, or ―
red‖ forces (e.g.
number of enemy submarines sunk). Collaborative interoperability on the other hand will
use MOEs based on the effectiveness of friendly systems to operate with each other (e.g.
number of successful communications messages sent and/or received).
Many definitions of the word ―
system‖ exist, but this research will maintain
Ford‘s definition of a system as, ―a
n entity comprised of related interacting elements,
which act together to achieve a purpose‖ and is ―
broad enough to include a wide variety
of systems including, but not limited to, technical, biological, environmental,
organizational, conceptual, physical, and philosophical, among others.‖ (Ford, 2008).
This broad view is critical to developing a flexible method to measure interoperability
and can be applied to the space acquisition domain. The notation for a set of systems is S
= {s1, s2…sn} where S represents the complete set of systems participating in the
operational scenario, and sn represents the individual systems.
Once the operational scenario and systems have been chosen, the interoperability
characters must be defined. At a high level, characters describe salient and distinct
attributes of a system (e.g. size, shape, function, etc.). The notation for characters is X =
{x1, x2…xn} where X represents the set of characters used to model the systems, and xn
represents the characters used to describe the individual systems. The states of these
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characters (e.g. the character ―
size‖ could have a state of ―
25 ft‖), is noted as C = {c1,
c2…cn} and follows Ford‘s formal definition:
DEFINITION (System Characterization): Given a set of systems S, then X : S 
C is a function which maps systems to a set of character states C and X is called
the characterization of S. (Ford, 2008)
For interoperability measurement, only certain types of characters, known as
interoperability characters, are used. These characters describe how the systems in the
scenario interoperate, and are generally based on the actions the systems must perform to
or accept from each other. These interactions, much like a conversation between two
people, have two primary components. One party transmits the action, the other receives
it. Ford‘s work provides a table of potential interoperability characters:
Table 1. Interoperability Characters (Ford, 2008)

In Ford‘s method, the states of these interoperability characters are usually
denoted using absence or presence states. That is, C = {0,1} where ―
zero‖ indicates the
11

absence and ―
one‖ indicates the presence of a specific interoperability character. Ford‘s
interoperability characters also capture the direction of the interoperation. A
conversation between two people is directional in nature. One person is transmitting
(speaking) a message in the direction of the other person, who is receiving (listening) the
transmitted message. A conversation between two people could be described as a ―
bidirectional interoperation‖ because both parties are able to transmit and receive messages.
If one person was mute or deaf, the interoperability between the conversational parties
could be described as a ―
uni-directional interoperation‖ because only one party is able to
transmit while the other can only receive. Ford captured these relationships graphically:

Figure 2. Directional Interoperability (Ford, 2008)
Once the systems and their characters are defined for a specific operational
scenario and interoperability measurement purpose, they are ―
instantiated‖ or listed as a
sequence of states for each system. For example, an aircraft could have characters of
―
type‖, ―
load‖ and ―
speed‖, and could be instantiated as a fighter jet with a weapons
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capacity of 10,000 pounds and a maximum speed of 1,200 miles per hour (fighter,
10,000 pounds, 1,200 mph).
DEFINITION (System Instantiation): Given a specific s ∈ S and a set x ⊆ X of system
characters descriptive of s, then x(s) is a sequence of system character states,
called the instantiation of s, which models s. (Ford, 2008)

Ford‘s interoperability measurement is based on a mathematical similarity
measurement. To put it simply, a similarity measurement is based upon distance. Items
that are similar have less distance, and items that are disparate have more distance
between them. There are various types of similarity measurements, and Ford chose to
use the Minkowski similarity function to base his analysis of interoperability
measurement upon. This function enables interoperability measurement between
multiple systems based upon shared interoperability characters that have been instantiated
and aligned. Ford captures the SimReal interoperability measurement as follows:

Equation 1. Average Character State Value (Ford, 2008)

Average Character State Value  w 

n

n

i 1

i 1

   i      i 
2ncmax

DEFINITION ( SimReal ): Given a pair of systems s, s instantiated as

 ,   

n

 0, cmax  , then I  SimReal  w  MMS , written out

completely in [equation 2] is an interoperability function which gives a
weighted, normalized measure of the similarity of systems instantiated
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with real-valued character states where w is the average character state
value of a pair of system instantiations, MMS is the Modified Minkowski
Similarity function, n is the number of characters used to instantiate
 ,   , cmax is the maximum character state value, and r is the

Minkowski parameter (usually set to r  2 ).
Equation 2. SimReal Interoperability Measurement (Ford, 2008)

I  SimRe al
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r
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i
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 1
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  i 1
  
i 1

   r n   
cmax
  
 i 1 
2ncmax

 


Ford‘s axiom further states:
AXIOM (System Similarity and Interoperability): If a pair of systems is
instantiated only with system interoperability characters, then the measure of
their similarity is also a measure of their interoperability. (Ford, 2008)
Levels of Information Systems Interoperability (LISI)
The LISI model was designed to measure information systems‘ interoperability by
determining the degree of interoperability achieved by systems or organizations (Kasunic
& Anderson, 2004). In short, it is a maturity model. The model uses four main
―
attributes of interoperability‖ (Kasunic & Anderson, 2004) to compose the framework
used to measure interoperability; procedures, applications, infrastructure, and data, also
known as PAID.

14

Table 2. LISI Attributes (Kasunic & Anderson, 2004)

The PAID attributes make up the columns of the LISI reference model. The rows in the
model define the level of interoperability maturity and are defined by the following (in
order of increasing maturity); isolated, connected, functional, domain and enterprise.
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Table 3. LISI Maturity Levels (Kasunic & Anderson, 2004)

The combination of the interoperability attributes with the interoperability maturity levels
results in the LISI reference framework:
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Table 4. LISI Reference Model (Ford, 2008)

Referencing back to Ford‘s method and the standard definition of interoperability,
LISI provides a way to qualify how well systems provide and use services between one
another to operate effectively. The ―
attributes of interoperability,‖ or PAID, describe key
characteristics necessary for interoperability to occur. In other words, the attributes are
the means by which the services are provided; they enable interoperability. The levels
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provide the characters‘ states where higher levels of maturity will result in higher levels
of interoperability.
The LISI model provides a good way to measure the overall interoperability
maturity of a particular system. It does not however, guarantee interoperability between
systems. Two systems possessing identical maturity levels as defined by LISI will not
interoperate if they use disparate technology, standards or interfaces. As Ford points out,
the LISI model‘s strength lies in its ability to facilitate a quantifiable interoperability
measurement (Ford, 2008).
Organizational Interoperability Maturity Model (OIM)
The model known as OIM was born from and uses the same basic structure as the
LISI model, but instead deals with interoperability between organizations. Instead of the
PAID attributes, OIM utilizes the attributes of preparedness, understanding, command
style and ethos:
Preparedness: This attribute describes the preparedness of the organisation to
interoperate. It is made up of doctrine, experience and training.
Understanding: The understanding attribute measures the amount of
communication and sharing of knowledge and information within the organisation
and how the information is used.
Command Style: This is the attribute that describes the management and
command style of the organisation – how decisions are made and how roles and
responsibilities are allocated/delegated.
Ethos: The ethos attribute is concerned with the culture and value systems of the
organisation and the goals and aspiration of the organisation. The level of trust
within the organisation is also included. (Clark & Jones)
The levels of organizational interoperability maturity again follow the LISI model‘s lead:
18

Level 0 - Independent - The Level 0 interoperability describes the interaction
between independent organisations. These are organisations that would normally
work without any interaction other than that provided by personal contact. They
are likely to be organisations that do not normally share common goals or purpose
but that may be required to interoperate in some scenario that has no precedent.
Essentially the arrangements are unplanned and unanticipated.
Level 1 - Ad hoc - At this level of interoperability only very limited
organisational frameworks are in place which could support ad hoc arrangements.
There will be some guidelines to describe how interoperability will occur but
essentially the specific arrangements are still unplanned. There will be some
overarching shared goal but individual organisation aspirations will take
precedence and the organisations remain entirely distinct.
Level 2 - Collaborative - The collaborative organisational interoperability level
is where recognised frameworks are in place to support interoperability and
shared goals are recognized and roles and responsibilities are allocated as part of
on-going responsibilities however the organisations are still distinct. Training is
likely to have taken place in some aspects of the interworking and significant
communication and sharing of knowledge does occur but the home organisations'
frameworks still have a significant influence.
Level 3 - Integrated - The integrated level of organisational interoperability is
one where there are shared value systems and shared goals, a common
understanding and a preparedness to interoperate, for example, detailed doctrine is
in place and there is significant experience in using it. The frameworks are in
place and practised however there are still residual attachments to a home
organisation.
Level 4 - Unified - A unified organisation is one in which the organisational
goals, value systems, command structure/style, and knowledge bases are shared
across the system. The organisation is interoperating on continuing basis. This is
really the ideal level where there is no impediment in the organisational
frameworks to full and complete interoperation. It is likely to occur only in very
homogeneous organisations. (Clark & Jones)
The organizational attributes and maturity levels are combined to form the OIM:
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Table 5. OIM (Clark & Jones)

The creators of OIM note that LISI is ―stron
gly technological‖ and ―
focuses on
system and technical compatibility,‖ and that OIM was created to ―look tathe layers of
the model that deal with organizational issues‖ (Clark & Jones). They further delineate
the differences between interoperability that is driven by process versus technology:
Where interoperability has been driven by process, the focus is on the situation,
the people and commander's intent.
Where interoperability has been driven by technology, the focus is on assets, their
properties and the levels of compatibility required.
Therefore, OIM qualitatively assesses organizational interoperability by measuring the
maturity of an organization‘s processes, their situation, the people involved and the
commander‘s intent. These focus areas are characterized by the attributes of
preparedness, understanding, command style and ethos. Again, the attributes are the
means by which the services from the definition of interoperability are provided, where
increased levels of maturity in each attribute area fundamentally result in an increase in
interoperability. While the attributes of preparedness, understanding, command style and
ethos are highly relevant to an operational commander and their troops‘ interoperation,
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other attributes may be selected to properly characterize a highly collaborative, noncombat acquisition system.
Ford’s Method Applied to OIM
Ford applied his interoperability measurement to the maturity model, in this case
OIM, to provide a way to quantifiably measure the interoperability between coalition
nations. An INTERFET coalition exercise was used to execute the measurement where
the systems (S) were the nations, their characters (X) were the attributes of preparedness,
understanding, command style, and ethos, and their character states (C) were represented
by the five levels of the maturity model (Ford, 2008):
S = {AUS,US,NZ,Thai,Phil,ROK}
X = {Preparedness,Understanding,Command Style,Ethos}
C = {0,1,2,3,4}
Using maturity level assessments derived from the INTERFET exercise, the instantiation
of S, X, and C yielded:
Table 6. INTERFET Instantiation (Ford, 2008)


 AUS

 US

   NZ
 Thai

 Phil
 ROK


Preparation Understanding Command Style Ethos 
2
3
3
1 
2
3
3
1 

2
3
3
1 
1
1
1
1 

1
1
1
1 
0
1
1
1 
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Ford‘s interoperability method is then easily applied to determine the level of
interoperability between the coalition nations during the INTERFET exercise:
Table 7. INTERFET Interoperability Measurement (Ford, 2008)


 AUS

 US

M   NZ
 Thai

 Phil
 ROK


AUS US
0.6 0.6
0.6 0.6
0.6 0.6
0.3 0.3
0.3 0.3
0.2 0.2

NZ Thai
0.6 0.3
0.6 0.3
0.6 0.3
0.3 0.3
0.3 0.2
0.2 0.2

Phil
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.2

ROK 
0.2 
0.2 

0.2 
0.2 

0.2 
0.2 

This method can be applied to any interoperability maturity model to determine how well
a nation or system interoperates with another.
Space Acquisition Failures and Lessons Learned
The Department of Defense‘s space acquisition community has suffered through
numerous failures as documented by the press, and perhaps more extensively, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO). It is important to briefly define what is meant
by a failed acquisition program. As defined by Merriam-Webster, failure is an ―
omission
of occurrence or performance; specifically, a failing to perform a duty or expected
action.‖ In space acquisition terms, a failure can be considered a failing to meet cost,
schedule or performance objectives as originally defined by the program at its inception.
A thorough review of past space acquisition failures was conducted. The majority
of inputs were authored by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), who has an
extensive history of evaluating space acquisition performance. The GAO reports were
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frequently corroborated by independent reviews and other sources, and revealed shared
reasons for space acquisition failures. Perhaps the best overall summary was provided by
a Defense Science Board report produced in 2003. The group was chaired by Mr. Tom
Young, a former Martin Marietta Chief Executive, and included membership from many
space acquisition stalwarts.
The report, simply titled ―
Acquisition of National Security Space Programs‖, and
despite its 2003 publication date, ―
discerned profound insights into systemic problems in
space acquisition‖ (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics, 2003) that still resonate within the space acquisition program offices of
today. The report highlighted five deep-seated shortcomings responsible for many of the
space acquisition failures of the past.
First, “cost has replaced mission success as the primary driver in managing
space development programs.” The report emphasizes the fragility of space acquisition
programs, citing how ―
thousands of good decisions can be undone by a single
engineering flaw or workmanship error, and these flaws and errors can result in
catastrophe‖ (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, 2003). In basic terms, trading schedule and cost savings at the expense of
mission success is a flawed approach. For space acquisitions programs, approximately
70% of the life cycle cost occurs before the system is fielded:
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Figure 3. Space Life Cycle Cost Curve (Hamel, 2007)
There is great pressure to maintain cost and schedule during this phase, but doing so at an
increased level of mission risk ultimately results in the opposite effect. The following
figure characterizes a typical situation; a program manager chooses to save budget and
schedule by using mission success as margin. The ultimate effect is an increased risk of
mission failure, which leads to greater cost increases and schedule delays in the future.
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Figure 4. Space Acquisition Scenario (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003)
Second, “unrealistic estimates lead to unrealistic budgets and unexecutable
programs.” This root cause stems primarily from optimistic cost estimates provided by
an incoming competitor and inadequate cost margin. The report states that ―
analysis of
recent space competitions found that the incumbent contractor loses more than 90 percent
of the time.‖ The incumbent contractor is ―
burdened‖ by its very relevant and real-world
legacy program experience, and will produce more realistic cost estimates for a follow-on
program. The incumbent is held at a disadvantage however, to a new, less experienced
contractor who may produce optimistic cost estimates to gain an edge in the competition.
If the less experienced contractor wins the new contract, the program office budget is
matched to the unrealistic estimate, almost guaranteeing future program delays and
increased risk to mission success. The report also cites an unhealthy emphasis on
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program advocacy at the expense of realism as a major contributor to unrealistic
estimates.
Third, “undisciplined definition and uncontrolled growth in system requirements
increase cost and schedule delays.” The inherent complexity of space systems and the
ever increasing numbers of users have driven program requirements and Key
Performance Parameters (KPP) to unmanageable proportions. The report adds, ―
clear
tradeoffs among cost, schedule, risk, and requirements are not well supported by rigorous
system engineering, budget, and management processes.‖ Programs with increased
numbers of users and KPPs are more likely to suffer cost and schedule delays.
Fourth, “government capabilities to lead and manage the space acquisition
process have seriously eroded.” Inexperienced program managers tend to adopt a ―
cando‖ attitude in place of programmatic rigor. Additionally, the report states:
Policies and practices inherent in acquisition reform inordinately devalued the
systems acquisition engineering workforce. As a result, today‘s government
systems engineering capabilities are not adequate to support the assessment of
requirements, conduct trade studies, develop architectures, define programs,
oversee contractor engineering, and assess risk. With growing emphasis on
effects-based capabilities and cross-system integration, systems engineering
becomes even more important and interim corrective action must be considered.
A less experienced acquisition workforce results in an inability to manage programs, and
very clearly results in program failures.
Fifth and finally, “industry has failed to implement proven practices on some
programs.” The report credits industry‘s knowledge of and ability to utilize proven
practices, but gently censures them for a lack of focus and dedication to the same.
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The GAO‘s 2003 report, ―
Military Space Operations: Common Problems and
their Effects on Satellite and Related Acquisitions,‖ provides a similarly useful summary
of space acquisition failures over the last two decades. It cites four primary root causes
of space acquisition failures, and corroborates many of the findings from the 2003
Defense Science Board report.
First, “requirements for what the satellite needed to do and how well it must
perform were not adequately defined at the beginning of a program or were changed
significantly once the program had already begun” (Government Accountability Office,
2003). The GAO asserts that this issue caused programs difficulty in matching
requirements to their resources, and resulted in cost and schedule increases. This finding
matches the third Defense Science Board finding listed above.
Second, “investment practices were weak. For example, potentially more costeffective approaches were not examined and cost estimates were optimistic”
(Government Accountability Office, 2003). The GAO specifically cites the lack of an
overall investment strategy for DOD space as the root cause, where shifts in budget were
unexpected, and money was often moved from healthier programs to pay for weaker
ones. This finding corroborates the second Defense Science Board finding above.
Third, “acquisition strategies were poorly executed. For example, competition
was reduced for the sake of schedule or DOD did not adequately oversee contractors”
(Government Accountability Office, 2003). The GAO adds that the DOD took a
―
schedule-driven versus a knowledge-driven approach to the acquisition process‖ which
strongly supports the first Defense Science Board finding listed previously.
27

Fourth, and finally, “technologies were not mature enough to be included in
product development” (Government Accountability Office, 2003). Although not
specifically stated, this cause is tied to the Defense Science Board‘s fourth finding above.
It can be inferred that a lack of program management and systems engineering rigor
allowed immature technologies to be used, ultimately resulting in increased program risk.
In 2006, a Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) panel was
commissioned by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to evaluate the overall defense
acquisition enterprise. The panel‘s major findings place significant emphasis on the
ability of acquisition‘s major elements to interoperate effectively:
The evidence we discovered was persistent in recognizing that an effective
Acquisition System requires stability and continuity that only can be provided
through successful integration of the major elements upon which it depends.
When we began this task, we presumed the Department‘s Acquisition System to
be an efficient integration of the acquisition, requirements and budget processes.
However, in the course of our review we found that the System is a highly
complex mechanism that is fragmented in its operation. (Defense Acquisition
Performance Assessment Project, 2006)
The report breaks defense acquisition into six major elements; organization, workforce,
budget, requirements, acquisition [process], and industry, and provides an assessment of
each element. Although not specific to space acquisition, the DAPA review generally
upholds the findings from the 2003 Defense Science Board report.
The panel found that “the current decision making process is flawed” in the
organization element introducing uncertainty and instability in program execution. The
panel cites several root causes including disconnects between the acquisition, budget and
requirements processes. This finding is captured at a high-level, and can be attributed to
many of the findings from the 2003 Defense Science Board‘s report.
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For the workforce element, the panel noted that “a successful program requires a
professional workforce with subject matter expertise.” The panel alludes to poor
integration of budget and requirements personnel into the acquisition workforce, as well
as a significant lack of experience and training as primary workforce problem areas. This
corresponds to the fourth Defense Science Board finding above. The panel also states:
Experience and expertise in all functional areas has been de-valued and
contributes to a ―
Conspiracy of Hope‖ in which we understate cost, risk and
technical readiness and, as a result, embark on programs that are not executable
within initial estimates. (Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project,
2006)
The ―
Conspiracy of Hope‖ strongly supports the first and second Defense Science Board
findings listed previously.
For the budget element, the panel emphasizes that, “successful Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation and Procurement programs require stable budgets
and accurate planning” and that this stability simply does not exist. The panel also
determined that budget shortfalls were often met by ―
stretching programs‖ whereby the
DOD ―
accepts long-term cost increases and delays in acquisition programs to achieve
short-term savings and budget flexibility.‖ These findings directly support the Defense
Science Board‘s first finding above. The panel also cites a problematic use of optimistic
budget estimates on acquisition programs, further supporting the Defense Science
Board‘s second finding.
The panel continues by listing a “lengthy and insufficiently advised requirement
development process” often based upon “immature technologies and overly optimistic
estimates of future resource needs and availability” as well as requirements instability as
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major problem areas in the requirements element. These findings validate the second and
third findings from the Defense Science Board report.
The acquisition element, when viewed from a process perspective, is
characterized by the panel as being part of the ―
Conspiracy of Hope‖ where “industry is
encouraged to propose unrealistic cost, optimistic performance and understate technical
risk estimates during the acquisition solicitation process and the Department is
encouraged to accept these proposals as the foundation for program baselines,”
reinforcing the Defense Science Board‘s second finding.
The panel found that the final element, industry, is extremely fragile, where
“consolidation of the industrial base, caused by unstable defense demand, has reduced
the benefits of competition, introduced industrial organizational conflict of interest
issues, and made every defense contract a “must win” situation for the prime
contractors.” This description does not directly relate to a specific Defense Science
Board finding, but can be cited as a contributing factor.
To summarize, the DAPA findings provide a more recent overview of acquisition
lessons learned that validate the earlier Defense Science Board findings from 2003.
Leading Indicators
The ―
Systems Engineering Leading Indicators Guide‖ serves as the primary
reference for leading indicators in this thesis. It states that ―aleading indicator is a
measure for evaluating the effectiveness of how a specific activity is applied on a project
in a manner that provides information about impacts that are likely to affect the system
performance objectives‖ and is useful to ―
support the effective management of systems
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engineering by providing visibility into expected project performance and potential future
states‖ (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, INCOSE, and PSM, 2010)1. Leading
indicators often use historical data and trends to provide this predictive measure of
performance and are ―
composed of characteristics, a condition and a predicted behavior‖:

Figure 5. Depiction of a Leading Indicator (Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
INCOSE, and PSM, 2010)
The characteristics are the data, the condition supplies the context in which to evaluate
the data, and when combined, they provide an indication or predicted behavior. The
strength scale captures the relative importance of the indicator based upon past
experience.
The guide recommends that leading indicators supplement a program‘s existing
set of measures, and urges them to properly set planned targets and thresholds using
1

General Use: Permission to reproduce, use this document or parts thereof, and to prepare derivative
works from this document is granted, with attribution to LAI, INCOSE, PSM, and SEAri, and the original
author(s), provided this copyright notice is included with all reproductions and derivative works.
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empirical data. If data is not available, expert opinion may be used to set targets. The
preferred method however is to utilize ―
a good historical base of information‖ where
―
organizations…build the collection of the historical measurement data into…collection
practices‖ (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, INCOSE, and PSM, 2010).
These targets are based upon the phases of the acquisition cycle as defined by
DOD Instruction 5000.02, and help programs understand readiness with respect to
program milestones. The applicability of the indicator also varies with program phase.
As illustrated by the following figure, the indicator ―
Requirements Trends‖ provides
insight in all acquisition phases, while ―
System Definition Change Backlog Trend‖ is
only applicable to three of the five phases.
Table 8. Systems Engineering Leading Indicators Overview (truncated)
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, INCOSE, and PSM, 2010)
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The guide provides 18 major leading indicators with example graphs and detailed
specifications for use on acquisition programs. The ―
Requirement Trends‖ display below
demonstrates how a leading indicator might be used on an acquisition program:

Figure 6. Requirements Trends Example (Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
INCOSE, and PSM, 2010)
In this example, the leading indicator shows a problem with requirements growth
which drives the program to take action in April. Later that summer, the program was
able to evaluate the effectiveness of their actions as the growth in requirements was
stemmed. The ―
Requirements Trends‖ leading indicator can be directly attributed to the
2003 Defense Science Board‘s finding ―
undisciplined definition and uncontrolled growth
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in system requirements increase cost and schedule delays” (Office of the Undersecretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003), and provides a way to
measure how well a program is or is not protecting itself from the causes of the
acquisition failures of the past.
It is important to recognize that lessons learned represent a source of historical
empirical data that can be used to develop a leading indicator. In this case, the Defense
Science Board, GAO and DAPA reports provide the characteristics and conditions in
which to formulate and evaluate a leading indicator of space acquisition program success.
Summary
The 2003 Defense Science Board and GAO reports provide a concise and
comprehensive review of the space acquisition failures of the past. Each report supports
the other‘s findings, and presents a strong case identifying the primary space acquisition
characteristics that drive success or failure. These characteristics can serve as attributes
or characters for the basis of an interoperability measurement and a leading indicator of
program performance.
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III. Methodology
Furthermore, if systems implement a confrontational operational process and are identified
and modeled in the context of a measure of operational effectiveness tied to that process, then
another fundamental result mathematically relates the change in interoperability of the
systems with a change in the measure of operational effectiveness.
—Thomas C. Ford (Ford, 2008)

Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a method to measure acquisition
interoperability using key, driving acquisition characters derived from past acquisition
experience. This method will use Ford‘s inaugural work on confrontational
interoperability measurement to create a new collaborative, acquisition interoperability
measurement, and will be applied to several space acquisition programs for
demonstration in the ―
Analysis and Results‖ chapter. These scenarios will also
emphasize the utility of the new method for assessing the effectiveness of acquisition
processes that must interact to accomplish a specific goal.
Space Acquisition Interoperability
Within an acquisition program, there is little doubt that cost, schedule and
requirements are intrinsically linked. The numerical values of cost in dollars, schedule in
years, and requirements in number of KPPs can be approximated using basic
mathematical relationships, e.g. more KPPs will result in an increase in cost and
schedule. Acquisition systems on the other hand drive the ability of a program to manage
and control these values. The people, processes and products that determine a program‘s
cost, schedule and requirements can be described as systems. The following figure from
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the Defense Science Board report supplies a depiction of the major space acquisition
systems found on a typical space program (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003):

Figure 7. Space Acquisition Systems (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003)
Note: In this case, the term “margin” is not a system in and of itself. It is better described as a
program characteristic. Additionally, the report included the term “launch” to illustrate specific
launch constraints placed upon a program, e.g. the satellite’s size and weight. Although launch is
an important aspect of any program, it was not explicitly cited as a prime cause of space
acquisition failures and was omitted as a result.

These acquisition systems must work together to create a program that is executable in
order to deliver mission performance on time and budget. More specifically, the cost,
schedule and requirements systems must provide and accept services from one another in
order to operate effectively. Therefore, using Ford‘s nomenclature, the space acquisition
systems are captured as: S = {cost, schedule, requirements}. Each system represents the
people, processes and products that determine and control the cost, schedule and
requirements for a given program.
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The interoperations that occur between these space acquisitions systems are
profuse and complex. Using the lessons learned from past space acquisition failures, the
quintessential interoperations can be extracted and applied to a maturity model. In order
to compose the model, the individual interoperations between systems must be examined.
Requirements-to-Schedule Interoperability
The requirements-to-schedule interoperation is most simply described in terms of
requirements stability, scope and complexity. As the 2003 Defense Science Board report
states, more Key Performance Parameters (KPP) as well as ―un
disciplined definition and
uncontrolled growth‖ in requirements will result in increased schedule (Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003). More
complex requirements may drive a program to pursue less mature technologies, which
will also result in increased schedule. The schedule system cannot effectively operate if
the requirements system is unstable or attempts to take major leaps in capability.
Schedule-to-Requirements Interoperability
This interoperation is focused on the program‘s intent and priority when
performing trades or utilizing margin. A program‘s requirements become less executable
when schedule is traded at the expense of mission assurance. Therefore, this relationship
is defined by the way the systems utilize shared margin, and how that use impacts the
program‘s overall executability. If the schedule system dominates trade decisions, the
requirements system will be compromised.
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Requirements-to-Cost Interoperability
The requirements-to-cost interoperation is analogous to the requirements-toschedule interoperation. More KPPs drive program complexity and decrease the ability
of the cost system to accurately predict and control program costs. Again, the
requirements drive the selection of technology. That is, a demand for cutting edge
performance will likely drive a state-of-the-art technology choice, which decreases cost
confidence. Additionally, the requirements influence the level of experience that exists
within industry. If the requirements system chooses to baseline a program that has no
legacy or comparable system, then the availability of experience will shrink, ultimately
decreasing cost confidence.
Cost-to-Requirements Interoperability
Unrealistic cost estimates have been a mainstay of space acquisition criticism and
are the driving factor in this interoperation. More realistic cost estimates will deliver a
program that is more executable. The ability of the cost system to justify and secure the
appropriate funding will also influence the requirements system‘s ability to achieve the
intended performance.
Schedule-to-Cost Interoperability
The schedule-to-cost interoperation again deals with realistic estimates and how
margin is utilized by the acquisition systems. In this case, a poor schedule estimate or
overly aggressive plan will result in a poor cost estimate. When schedule is traded at the
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expense of mission assurance, the cost system will suffer because it is forced to accept
more risk.
Cost-to-Schedule Interoperability
This interoperation is simply the reverse of the schedule-to-cost interoperation.
Therefore the schedule-to-cost or cost-to-schedule relationship is considered to be bidirectional.
Space Acquisition Interoperability Characters
The National Security Space Acquisition Policy Interim Guidance provides a
good starting point for character development. Paragraph 4, titled ―
DOD SPACE MDA
GUIDING PRINCIPLES‖ states, ―O
ver the first fifty years of the history of space
acquisition, several enduring principles have emerged. The following principles should
be considered by all NSS members to set the tone and guide decision making in the
acquisition of NSS systems‖ (Department of Defense, 2009). When merged with the key
system interoperations based upon past acquisition failures, the vital interoperability
characteristics that must be present and mature to enable mission success are revealed.
As captured in the interim guidance, the principles of ―
mission success‖, ―
stable‖,
―
disciplined‖ and ―
cost realism‖ best match the findings from the 2003 Defense Science
Board report:
Mission Success: The overarching principle behind all National Security Space
programs is mission success. When acquiring space systems, mission success
must be the first consideration when assessing the risks and trades among cost,
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schedule, and performance. Risk management, test planning, system engineering,
and funding profiles must be driven by this objective.
Stable: Within a given acquisition increment, stable budgets, stable
requirements, stable direction, and low personnel turnover are necessary for
successful program acquisition. Decisions made by the acquisition execution
chain must be durable.
Disciplined: All parties to this space acquisition policy must exercise the
discipline necessary to achieve its goals without allowing its procedures to
become unnecessarily burdensome and/or time consuming.
Cost Realism: The goal is to develop and grow a world-class national security
space cost estimating capability. Cost estimates must be independent and
accomplished in a timely, realistic, and complete manner. Cost will be controlled
by estimating accurately and focusing on quality to reduce rework and achieve
mission success. All members of the NSS acquisition execution chain must insist
on, and protect, a realistic management reserve.
These NSS principles are then tailored for the purpose of measuring acquisition
interoperability based upon the cardinal lessons learned. The following four acquisition
interoperability characters and definitions are produced:
Mission Focus: When acquiring space systems, mission success must be the first
consideration when assessing the risks and trades among cost, schedule, and
performance. Risk management, test planning, system engineering, and funding
profiles must be driven by this objective.
40

Stability: Within a given acquisition increment, stable budgets, stable
requirements, stable direction, and low personnel turnover are necessary for
successful program acquisition. Decisions made by the acquisition execution
chain must be durable. Technology is sufficiently mature and stable.
Discipline: The program must exercise the discipline necessary to achieve its
goals using an experienced acquisition team adhering to proven programmatic and
system engineering processes.
Realism: Program estimates must be independently verified and accomplished in
a timely, realistic, and complete manner. Technology, schedule and cost will be
controlled by estimating accurately and focusing on quality to reduce rework and
achieve mission success. All members of the NSS acquisition execution chain
must insist on, and protect, a realistic management reserve.
These four characters, X = {mission focus, stability, discipline, realism}, capture the chief
causes of space acquisition failures as described above at a high level. It is recognized
that lower levels of detail will discover additional, more specific characters that could
lend themselves to a more detailed measure of acquisition interoperability. As Ford
noted with OIM, ―
Although the final version of the OIM model remained limited to a 4attribute, 5-level model, at least 35 sub-attributes were further defined‖ however, ―
by not
addressing them as individual attributes, fidelity is lost from the model, and their contribution
is effectively averaged out‖ (Ford, 2008). Therefore it is important to only select the key and
driving characters as evidenced by past experience to avoid watering down the results with
less relevant characters.
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Incorporating Interoperability Lessons Learned Into a Maturity Model
The 2003 GAO and Defense Science Board reports on the space acquisition
enterprise provide the foundation for development of a space acquisitions maturity model
based upon the systems and characters described above. The levels of the maturity model
can be built by examining the recommended solutions from the 2003 Defense Science
Board report (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics, 2003) discussed earlier.
Maturity Model Levels
As illustrated earlier, the LISI and OIM models utilized a five-level scale to
define and measure the maturity of a system in a specific character. The acquisition
model will follow a similar five-level construct and is guided by the definitions provided
by OIM. Using Ford‘s nomenclature, the maturity levels represent character states; that
is, C = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
Level 0 – Separated: The system operates independently of others. The
system‘s goals are not congruent with others, and little evidence exists to guide decisionmaking. The people, processes and products of the system are inexperienced and
unproven.
Level 1 – Aligned: The system recognizes the impact it has on others and
considers space acquisition best practices and lessons learned when making decisions, but
continues to value its own goals over others. The people, processes and products possess
experience in the domain, but remain unproven for the task at hand.
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Level 2 – Structured: The system is aware of the impact it has on others and
utilizes space acquisition best practices and lessons learned when making decisions. The
system‘s decisions are made with a shared goal in mind. The people, processes and
products have experience executing a similar task.
Level 3 – Associated: The system understands its impact on others and has
incorporated space acquisitions best practices and lessons learned into its overall
baseline, as well as its decision making process. Decisions are made in a structured
environment with other systems using shared goals. The system will forgo its own
interests for the betterment of the whole. The people, processes and products have
executed similar tasks on many occasions.
Level 4 – Accordant: The system‘s decision-making process is integrated with
others. Space acquisition best practices and lessons learned are unified across all systems
and guide decision making. Knowledge is shared and understood across systems. The
system does not maintain its own interests; all efforts are integrated toward a shared goal.
The people, processes and products have successfully executed nearly identical tasks on
many occasions.
The Space Acquisition Interoperability Maturity Model (SAIMM)
The SAIMM fuses the space acquisition interoperability characters and maturity
levels into a format that readily facilitates an acquisition interoperability measurement
based upon space acquisition history. The character states capture the key and driving
aspects of each character, and reflect the significant drivers of the cost, schedule and
requirements systems‘ interoperation success.
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Table 9. SAIMM
MISSION FOCUS
STABILITY
DISCIPLINE
REALISM
Mission success is weighted
Stable budgets, stable requirements,
The acquisition team is experienced
Program estimates are independently
significantly higher than cost and
stable direction, and low personnel
(previous experience on the legacy
verified and accomplished in a timely,
schedule; its priority is reflected in risk
turnover are maintained across the
program as a prime contractor) and
realistic, and complete manner;
Level 4 management, test planning, system board; program decisions are constant; maintains strict adherence to proven
minimal rework is required; program
Accordant
engineering, and funding profiles
technology is mature (TRL 7 or higher) programmatic and system engineering funding and management reserve is
processes
realistic (80/20 cost confidence with
25% management reserve)
Mission success is weighted higher
Budgets, requirements, direction and
The acquisition team is experienced Program estimates are independently
than cost and schedule
personnel turnover rarely change and
(previous experience on the legacy
verified; rework is rarely required;
remain stable in critical areas; program program as a major subcontractor) and
program funding is unrealistic
Level 3 decisions rarely change; technology is
maintains adherence to proven
(between 80/20 and 50/50 cost
Associated
sufficiently mature (TRL 6)
programmatic and system engineering confidence) with realistic management
processes
reserve (20% or greater)
Mission success is weighted equally to Budgets, requirements, direction or
The acquisition team has some
Program estimates are independently
cost and schedule
personnel turnover change occasionally experience (previous experience on a verified but unrealistic in a few minor
Level 2 in a few minor areas; program decisions similar program as a subcontractor) and areas; rework is occasionally required;
Structured
change occasionally; technology
utilizes proven processes in most areas program funding is unrealistic (50/50
requires maturation (TRL 5)
cost confidence) with realistic
management reserve (20% or greater)
Cost and schedule are weighted higher Budgets, requirements, direction or
The acquisition team has limited
Program estimates are unrealistic in
than mission success
personnel turnover change frequently experience (previous experience on a
several critical areas; rework is
Level 1 in several critical areas; program
portion of a similar program) and has frequently required; program funding
Aligned
decisions change frequently;
knowledge of proven processes but
is unrealistic with inadequate (less
technology requires significant
does not use them consistently
than 20%) management reserve
maturation (TRL 4)
Cost and schedule are weighted
Budgets, requirements, direction and The acquisition team has no experience Program estimates are unrealistic and
significantly higher than mission
personnel turnover continually change (first-ever program) and does not have focused on program advocacy; rework
Level 0 success
in many critical areas; program
access to proven processes (they do not
is continually required; program
Separated
decisions continually change;
exist)
funding is unrealistic with little or no
technology is not mature (TRL 3)
management reserve

Note: The stability character also captures the legal requirement contained in Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 2366b that “the
technology in the program has been demonstrated in a relevant environment [commonly accepted as technology readiness level (TRL) 6], as
determined by the Milestone Decision Authority on the basis of an independent review and assessment by the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering”
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Summary
The SAIMM may be used to characterize the interoperability maturity of any
space acquisition program by providing a framework informed by the acquisition failures
of the past.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Recent operations have once again illustrated the degree to which U.S. national security
depends on space capabilities. We believe this dependence will continue to grow, and as
it does, the systemic problems we identify in our report will become only more pressing
and severe.
— Mr. A. Thomas Young (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, 2003)

Chapter Overview
Using the OIM construct and INTERFET exercise, Ford‘s interoperability
measurement provided insight into coalition nation interoperability. The SAIMM
construct delivers a mechanism to do the equivalent for the space acquisition world.
Space acquisition systems, S = {cost, schedule, requirements}, can be characterized using
the characters, X = {mission focus, stability, discipline, realism}, and character states, X
= {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, from SAIMM, which facilitates an interoperability measurement using
Ford‘s method. In this chapter, several space acquisition programs will be evaluated for
their acquisition systems‘ interoperability using SAIMM. A review of each evaluation
will be used to explain the utility of the acquisition interoperability measurement.
It is important to note that some subjectivity was required when evaluating the
programs in the following examples using SAIMM. Each SAIMM level includes
multiple factors for evaluating a program‘s maturity. For example, the SAIMM Level 3
in the stability character requires that ―
budgets, requirements, direction and personnel
turnover rarely change and remain stable in critical areas; program decisions rarely
change; technology is sufficiently mature.‖ A program could have mature technology but
suffer from requirements that frequently changed. The resulting SAIMM score in this
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character could fall somewhere between 1 and 3. In this and the following examples, the
worst case score was generally chosen. Scoring was further influenced by the historical
result and impact that the action or condition had on the program.
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) System
The AEHF system, the replacement for the aging MILSTAR constellation of
communications satellites, recently launched the first of four satellites into orbit. The
prime contractor for the system is Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company (Sunnyvale
California) and the payload provider is Northrup Grumman Aerospace Systems (Redondo
Beach California). Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company was also the prime
contractor on the legacy MILSTAR system.
AEHF was challenged by multiple launch slips and a Nunn-McCurdy breach in
September 2008. At program inception, five satellites were to be delivered at an
estimated cost of $5.4 billion. In 2003 the program scope had diminished to three
satellites, but the total program cost remained at $4.8 billion (Government Accountability
Office, 2003). This represents a growth in average per satellite cost by $570 million.
The GAO cites several factors in the requirements, schedule and cost systems that led to
AEHF‘s inability to meet its goals. The Department of Defense frequently altered
requirements, pursued an overly aggressive, unrealistic schedule, and did not have the
required funding to support the activities and manpower to design and build the satellites
faster (Government Accountability Office, 2003).
Based on this evidence, it is clear that the major failures were primarily caused by
poor interoperability in the stability and realism characters. Frequent requirement and
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design changes resulted in cost growth and schedule delays. Although the program
utilized an experienced (incumbent) contractor with strong technical maturity, they
pursued an incredibly aggressive schedule with inadequate funding. This unrealistic
schedule and cost effectively severely compromised the overall system‘s ability to
accomplish the requirements. The program‘s mission focus was also skewed in favor of
schedule and cost. Therefore, the AEHF SAIMM is scored as follows:
Table 10. AEHF SAIMM, 2003
MISSION FOCUS
STABILITY
DISCIPLINE
REALISM
Mission success is weighted
Stable budgets, stable requirements,
The acquisition team is experienced
Program estimates are independently
significantly higher than cost and
stable direction, and low personnel
(previous experience on the legacy
verified and accomplished in a timely,
schedule; its priority is reflected in risk
turnover are maintained across the
program as a prime contractor) and
realistic, and complete manner;
Level 4 management, test planning, system board; program decisions are constant; maintains strict adherence to proven
minimal rework is required; program
Accordant
engineering, and funding profiles
technology is mature (TRL 7 or higher) programmatic and system engineering funding and management reserve is
processes
realistic (80/20 cost confidence with
25% management reserve)
Mission success is weighted higher
Budgets, requirements, direction and
The acquisition team is experienced Program estimates are independently
than cost and schedule
personnel turnover rarely change and
(previous experience on the legacy
verified; rework is rarely required;
Level 3 remain stable in critical areas; program program as a major subcontractor) and
program funding is unrealistic
Associated
decisions rarely change; technology is
maintains adherence to proven
(between 80/20 and 50/50 cost
sufficiently mature (TRL 6)
programmatic and system engineering confidence) with realistic management
processes
reserve (20% or greater)
Mission success is weighted equally to Budgets, requirements, direction or
The acquisition team has some
Program estimates are independently
cost and schedule
personnel turnover change occasionally experience (previous experience on a verified but unrealistic in a few minor
Level 2 in a few minor areas; program decisions similar program as a subcontractor) and areas; rework is occasionally required;
Structured
change occasionally; technology
utilizes proven processes in most areas program funding is unrealistic (50/50
requires maturation (TRL 5)
cost confidence) with realistic
management reserve (20% or greater)
Cost and schedule are weighted higher Budgets, requirements, direction or
The acquisition team has limited
Program estimates are unrealistic in
than mission success
personnel turnover change frequently experience (previous experience on a
several critical areas; rework is
Level 1 in several critical areas; program
portion of a similar program) and has frequently required; program funding
Aligned
decisions change frequently;
knowledge of proven processes but
is unrealistic with inadequate (less
technology requires significant
does not use them consistently
than 20%) management reserve
maturation (TRL 4)
Cost and schedule are weighted
Budgets, requirements, direction and The acquisition team has no experience Program estimates are unrealistic and
significantly higher than mission
personnel turnover continually change (first-ever program) and does not have focused on program advocacy; rework
Level 0 success
in many critical areas; program
access to proven processes (they do not
is continually required; program
Separated
decisions continually change;
exist)
funding is unrealistic with little or no
technology is not mature (TRL 3)
management reserve
COST
SCHEDULE
REQUIREMENTS

This SAIMM score results in the following instantiation of AEHF:
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Table 11. AEHF Instantiation, 2003
AEHF (2003)

Mission Focus

Stability

Discipline

Cost

0

2

1

Realism
0

Schedule

0

2

1

1

Requirements

1

0

4

3

Recall that cmax represents the range of possible character states, n signifies the number of
characters used to instantiate the systems, and r is ordinarily set to 2. Using Ford‘s
Simreal function where r = 2, cmax = 4, and n = 4, and assuming no self-interoperability,
the interoperability measurement yields:
Table 12. AEHF Interoperability Measurement, 2003
AEHF (2003) - Sim Real

Cost

Schedule

Requirements

Cost

0.000

0.191

0.138

Schedule

0.191

0.000

0.176

Requirements

0.138

0.176

0.000

The AEHF program was again, albeit briefly reviewed by the GAO roughly five
months before the program‘s first launch in August of 2010. The report provided several
morsels of new evidence that can be used to update the program‘s interoperability
measurement from 2003. The program made significant progress since the 2003 GAO
report, but it came at the expense of hundreds of millions of dollars in cost growth and
multiple launch slips representing approximately four years of delay. The program
achieved strong stability and discipline in the requirements system, and maintained solid
maturity across the remaining systems and characters. The SAIMM for AEHF at this
point is as follows:
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Table 13. AEHF SAIMM, 2010
MISSION FOCUS
STABILITY
DISCIPLINE
REALISM
Mission success is weighted
Stable budgets, stable requirements,
The acquisition team is experienced
Program estimates are independently
significantly higher than cost and
stable direction, and low personnel
(previous experience on the legacy
verified and accomplished in a timely,
schedule; its priority is reflected in risk
turnover are maintained across the
program as a prime contractor) and
realistic, and complete manner;
Level 4 management, test planning, system board; program decisions are constant; maintains strict adherence to proven
minimal rework is required; program
Accordant
engineering, and funding profiles
technology is mature (TRL 7 or higher) programmatic and system engineering funding and management reserve is
processes
realistic (80/20 cost confidence with
25% management reserve)
Mission success is weighted higher
Budgets, requirements, direction and
The acquisition team is experienced Program estimates are independently
than cost and schedule
personnel turnover rarely change and
(previous experience on the legacy
verified; rework is rarely required;
remain stable in critical areas; program program as a major subcontractor) and
program funding is unrealistic
Level 3 decisions rarely change; technology is
maintains adherence to proven
(between 80/20 and 50/50 cost
Associated
sufficiently mature (TRL 6)
programmatic and system engineering confidence) with realistic management
processes
reserve (20% or greater)
Mission success is weighted equally to Budgets, requirements, direction or
The acquisition team has some
Program estimates are independently
cost and schedule
personnel turnover change occasionally experience (previous experience on a verified but unrealistic in a few minor
Level 2 in a few minor areas; program decisions similar program as a subcontractor) and areas; rework is occasionally required;
Structured
change occasionally; technology
utilizes proven processes in most areas program funding is unrealistic (50/50
requires maturation (TRL 5)
cost confidence) with realistic
management reserve (20% or greater)
Cost and schedule are weighted higher Budgets, requirements, direction or
The acquisition team has limited
Program estimates are unrealistic in
than mission success
personnel turnover change frequently experience (previous experience on a
several critical areas; rework is
Level 1 in several critical areas; program
portion of a similar program) and has frequently required; program funding
Aligned
decisions change frequently;
knowledge of proven processes but
is unrealistic with inadequate (less
technology requires significant
does not use them consistently
than 20%) management reserve
maturation (TRL 4)
Cost and schedule are weighted
Budgets, requirements, direction and The acquisition team has no experience Program estimates are unrealistic and
significantly higher than mission
personnel turnover continually change (first-ever program) and does not have focused on program advocacy; rework
Level 0 success
in many critical areas; program
access to proven processes (they do not
is continually required; program
Separated
decisions continually change;
exist)
funding is unrealistic with little or no
technology is not mature (TRL 3)
management reserve
COST
SCHEDULE
REQUIREMENTS
COST, SCHEDULE & REQUIREMENTS

Which results in the following interoperability instantiation:
Table 14. AEHF Instantiation, 2010
AEHF (2010)

Mission Focus

Stability

Discipline

Cost

3

3

3

Realism
3

Schedule

3

3

3

3

Requirements

3

4

4

3

Using Ford‘s Simreal function where r = 2, cmax = 4, and n = 4, and assuming no selfinteroperability, the interoperability measurement yields:
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Table 15. AEHF Interoperability Measurement, 2010
AEHF (2010) - Sim Real

Cost

Schedule

Requirements

Cost

0.000

0.750

0.669

Schedule

0.750

0.000

0.669

Requirements

0.669

0.669

0.000

National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (NPOESS)
NPOESS was a tri-agency program (Department of Commerce, National Air and
Space Administration, and the Department of Defense) that suffered through numerous
setbacks. Originally scheduled to launch in 2006, the program was restructured in 2007
due to a Nunn-McCurdy breach, and its first satellite, known as the NPOESS Prepatory
Project, is now scheduled to launch in late 2011 (Government Accountability Office,
2010). Earlier this year the program was cancelled and split into separate Department of
Commerce and Department of Defense programs. The prime contractor for NPOESS
was Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems (Los Angeles, California) who also had
significant experience building the DOD‘s legacy weather satellite, the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program.
In 2009, an independent review team was commissioned by the NPOESS
Executive Committee to review the program‘s management approach and to determine
key issues and risks. The review team was chaired by Mr. Tom Young, who was also the
chair of the 2003 Defense Science Board review team, and based on their findings
(NPOESS Independent Review Team, 2009), the NPOESS program demonstrated
significant issues across all of the major acquisition systems as manifested heavily in the
mission focus and stability characters. Cost and schedule took priority over mission
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success, budgets were inadequate, the management team lacked experience, and the
program‘s requirements were in conflict due to the tri-agency management structure.
The resulting SAIMM score:
Table 16. NPOESS SAIMM, 2009
MISSION FOCUS
STABILITY
DISCIPLINE
REALISM
Mission success is weighted
Stable budgets, stable requirements,
The acquisition team is experienced
Program estimates are independently
significantly higher than cost and
stable direction, and low personnel
(previous experience on the legacy
verified and accomplished in a timely,
schedule; its priority is reflected in risk
turnover are maintained across the
program as a prime contractor) and
realistic, and complete manner;
Level 4 management, test planning, system board; program decisions are constant; maintains strict adherence to proven
minimal rework is required; program
Accordant
engineering, and funding profiles
technology is mature (TRL 7 or higher) programmatic and system engineering funding and management reserve is
processes
realistic (80/20 cost confidence with
25% management reserve)
Mission success is weighted higher
Budgets, requirements, direction and
The acquisition team is experienced Program estimates are independently
than cost and schedule
personnel turnover rarely change and
(previous experience on the legacy
verified; rework is rarely required;
Level 3 remain stable in critical areas; program program as a major subcontractor) and
program funding is unrealistic
Associated
decisions rarely change; technology is
maintains adherence to proven
(between 80/20 and 50/50 cost
sufficiently mature (TRL 6)
programmatic and system engineering confidence) with realistic management
processes
reserve (20% or greater)
Mission success is weighted equally to Budgets, requirements, direction or
The acquisition team has some
Program estimates are independently
cost and schedule
personnel turnover change occasionally experience (previous experience on a verified but unrealistic in a few minor
Level 2 in a few minor areas; program decisions similar program as a subcontractor) and areas; rework is occasionally required;
Structured
change occasionally; technology
utilizes proven processes in most areas program funding is unrealistic (50/50
requires maturation (TRL 5)
cost confidence) with realistic
management reserve (20% or greater)
Cost and schedule are weighted higher Budgets, requirements, direction or
The acquisition team has limited
Program estimates are unrealistic in
than mission success
personnel turnover change frequently experience (previous experience on a
several critical areas; rework is
Level 1 in several critical areas; program
portion of a similar program) and has frequently required; program funding
Aligned
decisions change frequently;
knowledge of proven processes but
is unrealistic with inadequate (less
technology requires significant
does not use them consistently
than 20%) management reserve
maturation (TRL 4)
Cost and schedule are weighted
Budgets, requirements, direction and The acquisition team has no experience Program estimates are unrealistic and
significantly higher than mission
personnel turnover continually change (first-ever program) and does not have focused on program advocacy; rework
Level 0 success
in many critical areas; program
access to proven processes (they do not
is continually required; program
Separated
decisions continually change;
exist)
funding is unrealistic with little or no
technology is not mature (TRL 3)
management reserve
COST
SCHEDULE
REQUIREMENTS

Which yields the following NPOESS instantiation:
Table 17. NPOESS Instantiation, 2009
NPOESS

Mission Focus

Stability

Discipline

Cost

0

2

1

Realism
2

Schedule

1

2

1

1

Requirements

1

0

2

1

Using Ford‘s Simreal function where r = 2, cmax = 4, and n = 4, and assuming no selfinteroperability, the interoperability measurement yields:
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Table 18. NPOESS Interoperability Measurement, 2009
NPOESS - Sim Real

Cost

Schedule

Requirements

Cost

0.000

0.257

0.188

Schedule

0.257

0.000

0.203

Requirements

0.188

0.203

0.000

Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High
In the early 1990s, the DOD embraced a Total System Performance
Responsibility (TSPR) approach for system acquisitions. In theory, TSPR allowed the
government to leverage existing contractor management and commercial practices with
minimal oversight by turning government-led functions over to the contractor. In 1996,
the SBIRS program was initiated and Lockheed Martin was selected as the prime
contractor with Northrup Grumman as their major subcontractor. Northrup Grumman
was both the prime contractor and sensor developer for the legacy Defense Support
Program. Despite this legacy experience, the program generated expansive cost and
schedule failures. By the fall of 2001, SBIRS had an estimated cost growth in excess of
$2 billion (Government Accountability Office, 2003). After three Nunn-McCurdy
violations, problems on the SBIRS program have persisted to the present day as
manifested by a 200% change in total program cost and a unit cost growth of nearly $2.5
billion (Government Accountability Office, 2010).
The program instituted several independent reviews while the GAO continued to
monitor the program‘s progress against cost, schedule and performance goals. Three
reports were issued in 2003, 2005 and 2008 that capture various findings from
independent reviews, the GAO and others. The causes for the program‘s cost growth,
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schedule delays and performance issues are often attributed to the TSPR-model, but a
deeper examination is required to root out the specific causes of a ―
troubled program that
could be considered a case study for how not to execute a space program‖ (Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003).
The 2003 GAO report was issued after the program restructured in 2002. The
GAO determined that significant cost and schedule risk remained despite the
restructuring. From an acquisition system interoperability perspective, the SBIRS High
program had fatal flaws across all of the interoperability characters in each system. At
this point in time, the program moved ahead despite numerous best practice violations in
all characters. Requirements were not well understood and the overall complexity of the
program was underestimated. The management team was unable to deal with this
untenable situation, which resulted in ―theProgram Office and contractor having to spend
25 of the first 60 months of the contract on replanning activities‖ (Government
Accountability Office, 2003). The 2003 Defense Science Board summarized the core
issue, ―
In short, SBIRS High illustrates that while government and industry understand
how to manage challenging space programs, they abandoned fundamentals and replaced
them with unproven approaches that promised significant savings. In so doing, they
accepted unjustified risk‖ (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, 2003). The following SAIMM results:
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Table 19. SBIRS SAIMM, 2003
MISSION FOCUS
STABILITY
DISCIPLINE
REALISM
Mission success is weighted
Stable budgets, stable requirements,
The acquisition team is experienced
Program estimates are independently
significantly higher than cost and
stable direction, and low personnel
(previous experience on the legacy
verified and accomplished in a timely,
schedule; its priority is reflected in risk
turnover are maintained across the
program as a prime contractor) and
realistic, and complete manner;
Level 4 management, test planning, system board; program decisions are constant; maintains strict adherence to proven
minimal rework is required; program
Accordant
engineering, and funding profiles
technology is mature (TRL 7 or higher) programmatic and system engineering funding and management reserve is
processes
realistic (80/20 cost confidence with
25% management reserve)
Mission success is weighted higher
Budgets, requirements, direction and
The acquisition team is experienced Program estimates are independently
than cost and schedule
personnel turnover rarely change and
(previous experience on the legacy
verified; rework is rarely required;
Level 3 remain stable in critical areas; program program as a major subcontractor) and
program funding is unrealistic
Associated
decisions rarely change; technology is
maintains adherence to proven
(between 80/20 and 50/50 cost
sufficiently mature (TRL 6)
programmatic and system engineering confidence) with realistic management
processes
reserve (20% or greater)
Mission success is weighted equally to Budgets, requirements, direction or
The acquisition team has some
Program estimates are independently
cost and schedule
personnel turnover change occasionally experience (previous experience on a verified but unrealistic in a few minor
Level 2 in a few minor areas; program decisions similar program as a subcontractor) and areas; rework is occasionally required;
Structured
change occasionally; technology
utilizes proven processes in most areas program funding is unrealistic (50/50
requires maturation (TRL 5)
cost confidence) with realistic
management reserve (20% or greater)
Cost and schedule are weighted higher Budgets, requirements, direction or
The acquisition team has limited
Program estimates are unrealistic in
than mission success
personnel turnover change frequently experience (previous experience on a
several critical areas; rework is
Level 1 in several critical areas; program
portion of a similar program) and has frequently required; program funding
Aligned
decisions change frequently;
knowledge of proven processes but
is unrealistic with inadequate (less
technology requires significant
does not use them consistently
than 20%) management reserve
maturation (TRL 4)
Cost and schedule are weighted
Budgets, requirements, direction and The acquisition team has no experience Program estimates are unrealistic and
significantly higher than mission
personnel turnover continually change (first-ever program) and does not have focused on program advocacy; rework
Level 0 success
in many critical areas; program
access to proven processes (they do not
is continually required; program
Separated
decisions continually change;
exist)
funding is unrealistic with little or no
technology is not mature (TRL 3)
management reserve
COST
SCHEDULE
REQUIREMENTS

Which yields the interoperability instantiation of:
Table 20. SBIRS Instantiation, 2003
SBIRS (2003)

Mission Focus

Stability

Discipline

Cost

1

1

1

Realism
0

Schedule

0

1

1

1

Requirements

1

0

0

0

Using Ford‘s Simreal function where r = 2, cmax = 4, and n = 4, and assuming no selfinteroperability, the interoperability measurement yields:
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Table 21. SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2003
SBIRS (2003) - Sim Real

Cost

Schedule

Requirements

Cost

0.000

0.154

0.103

Schedule

0.154

0.000

0.094

Requirements

0.103

0.094

0.000

In 2005, many of the GAO‘s concerns were realized as the program continued to
experience difficulties. During this period, the Secretary of Defense was directed by
Congress to provide a report ―
on the cause of the most recent SBIRS cost increases,
schedule delays, and technical problems; the most recent Defense Support Program gap
analysis and any effect that further delays will have on U.S. early warning, technical
intelligence, and missile defense capabilities; steps taken to address the most recent
SBIRS technical difficulties; any adjustments in management and contract arrangements
with the contractor to reflect the most recent program challenges; remaining risk areas;
and an assessment of the confidence level in the SBIRS schedule and cost estimates
current as of October 1, 2004‖ (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005). The
subsequent report cited a lack of ―
sound system engineering processes and
procedures…insufficient schedule and budget…process escapes‖ and ―
an inadequate
architecture design and a flawed flight software development plan‖ (Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 2005). The report also cites several program initiatives designed to
―
better focus resources on key program issues,‖ and to ―f
ormally adopt an ‗event-driven‘
approach, replacing the ‗schedule-driven‘ mentality of the past…ensures the program no
longer enters an activity unless the probability for success is high‖ (Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 2005). Adjustments to the program‘s business rhythm, testing
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activities, and contract were also noted. These findings do not represent a major
improvement in the SBIRS program however as the findings from 2003 were either
realized or persisted. As such, there is not enough evidence presented in the 2005 report
to significantly alter the interoperability measurement from 2003.
Fast forward to 2008; SBIRS has just experienced a major setback with its flight
ambitious,‖ even ―
software and the GAO once again warns against an ―
optimistic‖ plan
to resolve the problems. The 2008 GAO report found that the issues largely stemmed
from the program‘s test and evaluation area, however it is more important to examine the
GAO‘s assessment of the program‘s plan going forward. With respect to the flight
software issue, significant interoperability issues remained in the mission focus, discipline
and realism characters. Cost and schedule estimates were overly optimistic, and there
was little to no margin to react to more problems if they occurred. The program also
requested waivers to forgo ―
disciplined processes,‖ which marginalized mission
assurance (Government Accountability Office, 2008).
Just prior to the GAO report, in 2007, another independent review team was
commissioned to review the program‘s status. The following chart summarizes the
program‘s progress against this independent review team‘s findings and
recommendations:
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Table 22. Independent Program Assessment (Government Accountability Office,
2008)

This table indicates the program has improved interoperability between the cost and
schedule systems, as well as between the government and contractor team. Based on the
2007 independent review team‘s findings and the 2008 GAO report, there is sufficient
evidence to update the program‘s SAIMM and interoperability measurements.
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Table 23. SBIRS SAIMM, 2008
MISSION FOCUS
STABILITY
DISCIPLINE
REALISM
Mission success is weighted
Stable budgets, stable requirements,
The acquisition team is experienced
Program estimates are independently
significantly higher than cost and
stable direction, and low personnel
(previous experience on the legacy
verified and accomplished in a timely,
schedule; its priority is reflected in risk
turnover are maintained across the
program as a prime contractor) and
realistic, and complete manner;
Level 4 management, test planning, system board; program decisions are constant; maintains strict adherence to proven
minimal rework is required; program
Accordant
engineering, and funding profiles
technology is mature (TRL 7 or higher) programmatic and system engineering funding and management reserve is
processes
realistic (80/20 cost confidence with
25% management reserve)
Mission success is weighted higher
Budgets, requirements, direction and
The acquisition team is experienced Program estimates are independently
than cost and schedule
personnel turnover rarely change and
(previous experience on the legacy
verified; rework is rarely required;
Level 3 remain stable in critical areas; program program as a major subcontractor) and
program funding is unrealistic
Associated
decisions rarely change; technology is
maintains adherence to proven
(between 80/20 and 50/50 cost
sufficiently mature (TRL 6)
programmatic and system engineering confidence) with realistic management
processes
reserve (20% or greater)
Mission success is weighted equally to Budgets, requirements, direction or
The acquisition team has some
Program estimates are independently
cost and schedule
personnel turnover change occasionally experience (previous experience on a verified but unrealistic in a few minor
Level 2 in a few minor areas; program decisions similar program as a subcontractor) and areas; rework is occasionally required;
Structured
change occasionally; technology
utilizes proven processes in most areas program funding is unrealistic (50/50
requires maturation (TRL 5)
cost confidence) with realistic
management reserve (20% or greater)
Cost and schedule are weighted higher Budgets, requirements, direction or
The acquisition team has limited
Program estimates are unrealistic in
than mission success
personnel turnover change frequently experience (previous experience on a
several critical areas; rework is
Level 1 in several critical areas; program
portion of a similar program) and has frequently required; program funding
Aligned
decisions change frequently;
knowledge of proven processes but
is unrealistic with inadequate (less
technology requires significant
does not use them consistently
than 20%) management reserve
maturation (TRL 4)
Cost and schedule are weighted
Budgets, requirements, direction and The acquisition team has no experience Program estimates are unrealistic and
significantly higher than mission
personnel turnover continually change (first-ever program) and does not have focused on program advocacy; rework
Level 0 success
in many critical areas; program
access to proven processes (they do not
is continually required; program
Separated
decisions continually change;
exist)
funding is unrealistic with little or no
technology is not mature (TRL 3)
management reserve
COST
SCHEDULE
REQUIREMENTS

Which yields the following instantiation:
Table 24. SBIRS Instantiation, 2008
SBIRS (2008)

Mission Focus

Stability

Discipline

Cost

1

2

3

Realism
2

Schedule

0

2

3

2

Requirements

1

3

2

1

Using Ford‘s Simreal function where r = 2, cmax = 4, and n = 4, and assuming no selfinteroperability, the interoperability measurement yields:
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Table 25. SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2008
SBIRS (2008) - Sim Real

Cost

Schedule

Requirements

Cost

0.000

0.410

0.367

Schedule

0.410

0.000

0.328

Requirements

0.367

0.328

0.000

The GAO provided a brief assessment of the SBIRS High program again in 2010
and noted that ―a
ll three critical technologies…are now mature‖ and ―
99 percent of
the…expected design drawings are now releasable,‖ but also cited ―
design-related
problems‖ and an assessment of cost and schedule as ―hi
gh risk‖ (Government
Accountability Office, 2010). This update delivers an adequate amount of new
information to update the program‘s SAIMM. The program has matured significantly in
the mission focus character, but continues to suffer from a lack of realism. Stability has
improved to a lesser degree as the maturity of the design and requirements is high, but
discipline remains unchanged due to continued problems and unknowns with the flight
software, and an apparent inability to control and plan the remaining work required. The
2010 GAO assessment yields the following SAIMM:
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Table 26. SBIRS SAIMM, 2010
MISSION FOCUS
STABILITY
DISCIPLINE
REALISM
Mission success is weighted
Stable budgets, stable requirements,
The acquisition team is experienced
Program estimates are independently
significantly higher than cost and
stable direction, and low personnel
(previous experience on the legacy
verified and accomplished in a timely,
schedule; its priority is reflected in risk
turnover are maintained across the
program as a prime contractor) and
realistic, and complete manner;
Level 4 management, test planning, system board; program decisions are constant; maintains strict adherence to proven
minimal rework is required; program
Accordant
engineering, and funding profiles
technology is mature (TRL 7 or higher) programmatic and system engineering funding and management reserve is
processes
realistic (80/20 cost confidence with
25% management reserve)
Mission success is weighted higher
Budgets, requirements, direction and
The acquisition team is experienced Program estimates are independently
than cost and schedule
personnel turnover rarely change and
(previous experience on the legacy
verified; rework is rarely required;
remain stable in critical areas; program program as a major subcontractor) and
program funding is unrealistic
Level 3 decisions rarely change; technology is
maintains adherence to proven
(between 80/20 and 50/50 cost
Associated
sufficiently mature (TRL 6)
programmatic and system engineering confidence) with realistic management
processes
reserve (20% or greater)
Mission success is weighted equally to Budgets, requirements, direction or
The acquisition team has some
Program estimates are independently
cost and schedule
personnel turnover change occasionally experience (previous experience on a verified but unrealistic in a few minor
Level 2 in a few minor areas; program decisions similar program as a subcontractor) and areas; rework is occasionally required;
Structured
change occasionally; technology
utilizes proven processes in most areas program funding is unrealistic (50/50
requires maturation (TRL 5)
cost confidence) with realistic
management reserve (20% or greater)
Cost and schedule are weighted higher Budgets, requirements, direction or
The acquisition team has limited
Program estimates are unrealistic in
than mission success
personnel turnover change frequently experience (previous experience on a
several critical areas; rework is
Level 1 in several critical areas; program
portion of a similar program) and has frequently required; program funding
Aligned
decisions change frequently;
knowledge of proven processes but
is unrealistic with inadequate (less
technology requires significant
does not use them consistently
than 20%) management reserve
maturation (TRL 4)
Cost and schedule are weighted
Budgets, requirements, direction and The acquisition team has no experience Program estimates are unrealistic and
significantly higher than mission
personnel turnover continually change (first-ever program) and does not have focused on program advocacy; rework
Level 0 success
in many critical areas; program
access to proven processes (they do not
is continually required; program
Separated
decisions continually change;
exist)
funding is unrealistic with little or no
technology is not mature (TRL 3)
management reserve
COST
SCHEDULE
REQUIREMENTS
COST, SCHEDULE & REQUIREMENTS

Resulting in the following interoperability instantiation:
Table 27. SBIRS Instantiation, 2010
SBIRS (2010)

Mission Focus

Stability

Discipline

Cost

3

3

3

Realism
1

Schedule

3

3

3

1

Requirements

3

4

2

1

Using Ford‘s Simreal function where r = 2, cmax = 4, and n = 4, and assuming no selfinteroperability, the interoperability measurement yields:

61

Table 28. SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2010
SBIRS (2010) - Sim Real

Cost

Schedule

Requirements

Cost

0.000

0.625

0.515

Schedule

0.625

0.000

0.515

Requirements

0.515

0.515

0.000

Interpreting the Results
The interoperability measurements for AEHF, NPOESS and SBIRS High
demonstrate how the SAIMM can be used to measure a space acquisition program‘s
interoperability maturity, and then measure interoperability between its major systems.
The measurements also show how the interoperability can change over time and with
respect to program phases. A specific tie between the interoperability measurement and
actual cost, schedule and requirements performance has not been directly established, but
is indirectly captured by using the examples of the past. Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that a measurement of a failed program‘s interoperability can provide a baseline
from which to compare other programs‘ interoperability and chance of success or failure.
For AEHF, interoperability measurements were provided in 2003 and 2010.
According to GAO reports, during that time the program‘s overall cost nearly doubled
from 4.8 to 10.4 billion dollars and the predicted launch date slipped approximately four
years. The interoperability measurements also exhibit dramatic differences:
Table 29. AEHF Interoperability Measurement, 2003
AEHF (2003) - Sim Real

Cost

Schedule

Requirements

Cost

0.000

0.191

0.138

Schedule

0.191

0.000

0.176

Requirements

0.138

0.176

0.000
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Table 30. AEHF Interoperability Measurement, 2010
AEHF (2010) - Sim Real

Cost

Schedule

Requirements

Cost

0.000

0.750

0.669

Schedule

0.750

0.000

0.669

Requirements

0.669

0.669

0.000

The program launched shortly after the 2010 interoperability measurement was taken. It
is expected that a program‘s interoperability measurement will converge to 1 as it
approaches a launch since most of the mandatory reviews and maturity gates for the
program will have been passed. Accordingly, an increase in the program‘s measure of
interoperability indicates an increase the program‘s mission readiness.
The NPOESS program experienced extreme difficulties and was eventually
cancelled as a result. According to GAO records, the program cost estimate was 6.1
billion dollars in 2003, but ballooned to 13.1 billion dollars in 2010. During this same
period, the predicted launch date moved from 2009 to 2014. The 2003 NPOESS
interoperability scores are reasonably close to the 2003 AEHF scores, and point toward
significant program issues and a severely hampered ability to achieve cost, schedule and
performance goals.
Table 31. NPOESS Interoperability Measurement, 2009
NPOESS - Sim Real

Cost

Schedule

Requirements

Cost

0.000

0.257

0.188

Schedule

0.257

0.000

0.203

Requirements

0.188

0.203

0.000

The SBIRS High program is a notorious example of inability to meet cost,
schedule and performance goals. Between 2003 and 2010, the program‘s cost grew by
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5.1 billion dollars and the launch date slipped approximately four years. Unit cost grew
by almost two billion dollars. The program‘s interoperability scores were lower than
both the AEHF and NPOESS scores in 2003 due to severe problems across all
interoperability characters:
Table 32. SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2003
SBIRS (2003) - Sim Real

Cost

Schedule

Requirements

Cost

0.000

0.154

0.103

Schedule

0.154

0.000

0.094

Requirements

0.103

0.094

0.000

In 2008, the program improved in three out of four areas, but continued to place mission
success at risk due to cost and schedule goals and constraints. The program was readying
for launch, but the interoperability scores did not exhibit a level of interoperability
maturity comparable to AEHF just prior to its launch in 2010:
Table 33. SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2008
SBIRS (2008) - Sim Real

Cost

Schedule

Requirements

Cost

0.000

0.410

0.367

Schedule

0.410

0.000

0.328

Requirements

0.367

0.328

0.000

This difference in interoperability maturity reflects the substantial risks and issues
remaining on the program. In 2010, the program continued to experience problems due
to flight software issues. The GAO and other independent estimates stressed a lack of
realism in the program‘s ability and plan to resolve the problem. Despite a marked
increase in the mission focus, stability and discipline characters, the program remained
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less interoperable in the realism character. The interoperability scores again indicated
improvement, but did not reach the same level as AEHF just prior to their launch:
Table 34. SBIRS Interoperability Measurement, 2010
SBIRS (2010) - Sim Real

Cost

Schedule

Requirements

Cost

0.000

0.625

0.515

Schedule

0.625

0.000

0.515

Requirements

0.515

0.515

0.000

The SBIRS High program now projects a launch date in early 2011.
These high-level correlations between a program‘s interoperability score and its
resulting performance reveal the interoperability measurement‘s ability to serve as a
leading indicator for space acquisition success or failure. The measurement also provides
insight into where interoperability can be improved to increase chances of program
success.
Summary
A method to measure space acquisition interoperation, using system
interoperability, was developed based upon Ford‘s interoperability measurement work.
The measurement was facilitated by a maturity model that was built using the lessons
learned and best practices from space acquisition failures of the past. The method
measured interoperability between space acquisition systems, S = {cost, schedule,
requirements}, using key and driving acquisition characters, X = {mission focus, stability,
discipline, realism} based on five character state levels, C = {separated, aligned,
structured, associated, accordant}, and applied to three specific acquisition programs.
The resulting measurements were then compared to demonstrate how the method can be
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used as a leading indicator of the program‘s ability to execute the required level of
performance on time and within budget.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
…a host of problems not previously viewed as interoperability related can now be looked at
as such. This means that many old problems can be solved in a new way, possibly lending
insight or providing a means of reporting progress not previously available.
—Thomas C. Ford (Ford, 2008)

This is a logical and progressive evolution in warfare, yet its tenets remain
undemonstrated and unproven…The network-centric warfare objective needs further
investigation and technological exploitation for it to be…a workable system.
—Lt. Col. Edmund C. Blash, USAR (Blash, 2003)

Conclusions of Research
Ford‘s interoperability measurement using a maturity model is indeed a powerful
tool that can be used to measure the quality of acquisition system interactions. As Ford
notes, ―
SimReal has the capability of yielding very precise similarity measures of system
instantiations limited only by the number of characters and the precision of those
characters‘ states‖ (Ford, 2008). In this case, the maturity model dictates the number and
precision of characters. The SAIMM was built upon experts‘ analysis of past space
acquisition failures and their recommendations for improvement. In other words, the
SAIMM captures the specific system attributes that must be present and mature in order
for a program to avoid the mistakes of past space acquisition programs. These attributes
are universal and may be applied to any major space acquisition program, but the model‘s
precision suffers as a result. As such, a SAIMM facilitated interoperability measurement
is best used on a macro level to gage a program‘s health and status.
The SAIMM is principally based upon the lessons learned from space acquisition
program failures, and does not consider expert analysis of programs that were deemed
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successful. Finding examples of program successes is extremely difficult due to the
extent and complexity of space acquisition programs, and little, if any expert analyses
exist in the publically available literature. The SAIMM is valuable because it is based on
the cause and effect of real-world events, but it is important to note that SAIMM is rooted
in lessons learned almost exclusively from programs that failed to meet their goals.
Future versions of the SAIMM or similar models must strive to capture and incorporate
evidence from program successes to improve the robustness and richness of the model.
In conclusion, the concept of acquisition interoperability was described and linked
to program success or failure by utilizing a maturity model based upon past space
acquisition experience. The method was demonstrated by measuring the interoperability
between the cost, schedule and requirement systems in three major space programs
during various acquisition phases. The results were compared to validate the utility of
the method as a potential leading indicator of space acquisition success or failure. LTC
Blash‘s caveat must be heeded however; ―
further investigation‖ is indeed required to
mature the model and understand the relationship between interoperability and program
performance before it can be used as an effective space acquisition metric.
Recommendations for Future Research
Ford states that ―
The flexibility of the method supports the instantiation of
systems at any level of abstraction, with resultant interoperability measurements at any
desired level of precision.‖ The SAIMM and resulting interoperability measurements are
captured at a very high level of abstraction and should only be used at the macro level.
Future research is needed to increase the depth and breadth of the SAIMM in order to
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enable a more precise measurement. As alluded to earlier, the bulk of the publically
available knowledge on space acquisition focuses on programs that have or are currently
not meeting their cost, schedule and performance targets. Very few analyses of
―
successful‖ space acquisition programs have been conducted, and the addition of lessons
learned based on successful programs will improve the SAIMM‘s ability to properly
characterize a space program‘s acquisition interoperability. Additionally, the bulk of the
information used to build the SAIMM was supplied by the GAO and independent review
teams led by Mr. Tom Young. Although extremely valuable, there are other sources of
data that can be used to improve the SAIMM‘s precision. This may limit the ability of
the material to be publically released, but would still provide benefit to most government
entities.
Further research must also consider the fundamental building blocks of SAIMM
and the interoperability measurements used in this thesis. Additional systems and
characters, to include the way they are captured in the model itself, can mature the
SAIMM for both generic and specific purposes. Further decomposition of the cost,
schedule and requirements systems could improve the precision of the SAIMM. For
example, the requirements system could be broken into the requirements (user-centric)
and design (program office-centric) systems. The purpose and context of the
measurement, as well as increased knowledge of lessons learned will reveal new and
important characters for consideration. The interoperation between the cost, schedule
and requirement‘s systems processes, methods and tools should be considered, as well as
the influence of the systems‘ interoperation in the flexibility and transparency characters.
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It is also recommended that future research further leverage the benefit of
hindsight to solidify and better quantify the relationship between acquisition system
interoperability and a program‘s cost, schedule and performance. One possible way to do
this would be to build a baseline of interoperability measurements across many space
acquisition programs during various acquisition phases. This baseline of interoperability
measurements could then be compared to the actual cost, schedule and mission
performance of the programs to infer a cost per unit of interoperability metric. A simple
example might consider how much a program‘s interoperability improved or declined
between systems, and how much cost, schedule or performance was impacted as a result.
This effort would likely require extensive analysis and a more precise SAIMM in order to
produce meaningful results.
An analysis of how the program‘s acquisition phase and context affects the
interoperability measurement and program performance would also serve as a valuable
contribution to this area of research. Ford states (Ford, 2008):
Interoperability is generally time variant. For example, atmospheric effects due to
the changes from night to day will degrade the optical interoperability of
reconnaissance satellites and ground targets. Similarly, the directional
interoperability of an attacker and his target may increase as the attacker has
ingressed long enough to come in range of the target. Finally, end-to-end
computer interoperability may improve or diminish with changes in network
congestion tied to worker shift changes, lunchtime usage, etc.
Within the context of space acquisitions, it is important to consider how the
interoperability characters vary in time based on the program‘s acquisition phase. For
instance, the character stability may prove to be more valuable later in a program‘s life
than earlier. It should also be recognized that the characters selected for the SAIMM may
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not adequately capture the interoperability needs across the program‘s acquisition
lifecycle. Additional characters may need to be developed to fully portray the key and
driving interoperability factors during each phase of the acquisition program.
The concept above could be expanded to include statistical predictions based
upon the baseline of past space acquisition experience. Distribution models or Monte
Carlo analysis could be used to correlate interoperability measurements against actual
program performance. A series of probability curves or other tools could then link a
measurement of a current program‘s acquisition system interoperability to a probability
of success or failure, i.e. program x‘s interoperability score of y between the cost and
schedule systems indicates the program has a 65% chance of exceeding its current
budget.
Finally, it is recommended that prospective research consider how the acquisition
interoperability measurement be incorporated into a larger framework of metrics, most
likely driven by the ―
Systems Engineering Leading Indicators Guide‖ referred to earlier.
Summary
This research combines the power of Ford‘s interoperability measurement with
the lessons harvested from decades of space acquisition experience, and as such, is
inherently tied to overall acquisition effectiveness. It provides a way to characterize a
program‘s health by measuring its ability to interoperate between the cost, schedule and
requirements systems. The measurement can be used as a leading indicator of program
performance, a guide to locate and solve issues, and can be tailored for use in many
different contexts and situations.
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There appears to be great utility and power in this measurement, but much work
remains to be done in order to operationalize it. The institutions responsible for space
program execution, and more importantly, delivering capability to the warfighter and our
nation, must continue to foster and invest in ways to measure and improve programmatic
and system engineering rigor.
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Appendix A – Independent Assessments of AEHF, NPOESS and SBIRS High
In 2003, the GAO assessed the AEHF program‘s status as follows (Government
Accountability Office, 2003):
2003 GAO reported in the early phases of the program, DOD substantially and
frequently altered its requirements; the system design changed. While considered
necessary, some changes increased costs by hundred of millions of dollars and
caused scheduling delays.
2003 GAO reported that once DOD decided to accelerate its plans to build the
satellites, the contractors proposed and DOD agreed to support a high-risk
schedule that turned out to be overly optimistic and highly compressed—leaving
little room for error and depending on a chain of events taking place at certain
times. Substantial delays occurred when some events, such as the award of the
contract or the availability of equipment, did not occur on time. In commenting
on the AEHF report, DOD noted the decision to accelerate the program was based
on a satellite constellation gap caused by the loss of a Milstar satellite. DOD also
stated many in DOD expressed concern about the risks, but believed the risk was
acceptable based on information known at the time.
2003 GAO reported that at the time DOD decided to accelerate the program, it did
not have the funding needed to support the activities and manpower needed to
design and build the satellites quicker. The lack of funding also contributed to
schedule delays, which in turn, caused more cost increases.
2003 GAO reported that the program demonstrated most technology knowledge at
development with 11 of 12 critical technologies having reached maturity
according to best practice standards. However, the program office did not project
achieving maturity on the remaining technology—the phased array antenna— by
the design review in June 2004 and did not have a backup capability. Program
officials assessed the software development for the mission control system as
moderate risk and have developed a risk mitigation strategy. However, until these
mitigation actions are completed, software may be at risk for unplanned cost and
schedule growth.
2003 GAO reported that significant design changes affected cost and delayed the
AEHF schedule. For example, software growth occurred as more requirements
were added and as the design of the system stabilized. These increases in software
requirements for both the satellite and the mission control segments increased the
software cost estimate by over 77 percent or about $223 million.
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The GAO provided a brief synopsis of the AEHF program‘s status just prior to the
launch of AEHF-1 in August of 2010 (Government Accountability Office, 2010):
According to the program office, all 14 AEHF critical technologies are mature,
with all either flight- qualified through test and demonstration or flight- proven
through successful mission operations. System-level environmental testing for the
first satellite was completed in July 2009. The AEHF‘s design appears stable with
all of its expected design drawings released.
…during initial system level environmental testing for the first and second
satellites, several flight boxes experienced failures due to defective components
that required removal, repair, and reinstallation. Because of the number of
components that had to be removed and reinstalled, the first satellite had to
undergo an additional round of system-level environmental tests. These actions
delayed the first launch almost 2 years and increased program cost. According to
the program office, the additional testing was successfully completed in July
2009. The second satellite also completed system level environmental testing in
2009, and no new problems or issues were discovered.
An independent review team, led by Mr. Tom Young, assessed the NPOESS
program in 2009 (NPOESS Independent Review Team, 2009):
The priorities of NOAA, NASA and DOD/USAF are not aligned: The DOD has
stated that while the program should continue to pursue the current NPOESS
requirements, the DOD is willing to accept legacy performance (DMSP and
POES) to maintain continuity, cost and schedule goals and is not willing to
provide additional funding to pursue requirements beyond legacy. NOAA states
that legacy performance would be a step back in today‘s performance because of
their current operational use of NASA research satellites that are well beyond
their design life
NPOESS is being managed with cost as the most important parameter: One
observation of this cost priority is reflected in the award fee structure and its
emphasis on cost control. Successful space acquisition requires mission success
to be the top priority not cost as the overarching factor
The PEO and IPO do not have sufficient space systems acquisition expertise
and processes: The NPOESS program is not part of a supporting space systems
acquisition center, such as the AF Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) or
the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). These types of established
space acquisition organizations can provide institutional knowledge, robust
infrastructure support, and a cadre of seasoned space systems acquisition experts
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Funding shortfalls are causing the IPO to make short-sighted decisions to cover
VIIRS cost growth and stay within allocated budget at a significant increase to
outyear costs and program risks: While the IPO has no choice but to make these
decisions, risk is being deliberately built into the program to stay within allocated
budget.
The current budget is inadequate: Budgeting to a 50-50 cost estimate leads to
insufficient funding. It lacks sufficient management reserve, and as noted in
Finding #6, this leads to programs using risk as its management reserve. The
current budget is not at the 50/50 level. The most probable cost is at the 80/20
level including reserves
The SBIRS program has been reviewed numerous times by the GAO and other
entities. The 2003 GAO report lists the following findings (Government Accountability
Office, 2003):
History of moving forward without sufficient knowledge to ensure that the
product design is stable and meets performance requirements and that adequate
resources are available
The program passed its critical design review with only 50 percent of its design
drawings completed, compared to 90 percent as recommended by best practices.
Consequently, several design modifications were necessary, including 39 to the
first of two infrared sensors to reduce excessive noise created by electromagnetic
interference—a threat to the host satellite‘s functionality—delaying delivery of
the sensor by 10 months or more
The program was too immature to enter the system design and development
phase. Program activation was based on faulty and overly optimistic assumptions
about software reuse and productivity levels, the benefits of commercial practices,
management stability, and the level of understanding of requirements.
The complexity of developing engineering solutions to meet system requirements
was not well understood by program and contracting officials. The systems
integration effort was significantly underestimated in terms of complexity and the
associated impacts. In addition, the requirements refinement process was ad hoc,
creating uncertainty on the status of program priorities and affecting cost and
schedule.
Breakdown in execution and management. Overly optimistic assumptions and
unclear requirements eventually overwhelmed government and contractor
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management. The 2-year delay of the GEO satellite launches, which occurred in
1998, contributed to management instability and was a factor in the Program
Office and the contractor having to spend 25 of the first 60 months of the contract
on replanning activities.
The Department of Defense was tasked by Congress to provide a report on the
SBIRS High program‘s status in 2005 (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005) which
listed the following findings:
Latent defects, resulting from insufficient product assurance activity in earlier
design and production activities…lack of sound system engineering processes and
procedures
Insufficient schedule and budget to ensure robust GEO first article integration/
test…insufficient time scheduled for GEO system integration and test; SPO
concluded the ground software productivity levels were optimistic; the flight
software architecture was not sufficiently defined to allow software coding; and
inadequate on-orbit checkout time was planned. Finally, the resources and tools
for simulations, analysis, and troubleshooting were inadequate and required more
effort
Process escapes due to human error/insufficient training/fragile
processes…improper or inadequate processes, insufficient training, questionable
inspection practices, and/or human error as causal factors. Recent events include
excess debris or contamination in delivered hardware, improper use of soldering
materials, improper installation of thermal blankets, and missing test procedure
documentation
A poor design and build implementation to comply with the EMI specifications of
the HEO P/L…flawed design approach
Faulty hardware and software design of the HEO/GEO flight computers, i.e., the
single board computer ‗halt‘ anomalies…hardware design problem with a control
signal on an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC)
An inadequate architecture design and a flawed flight software development plan
for the GEO satellite‘s Signal Processing Assembly (SPA)…state of the software
architecture, a very aggressive contractor schedule, and inadequate planning
The GAO again assessed the SBIRS High program in 2008 following a setback
with the program‘s flight software (Government Accountability Office, 2008):
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While DOD has estimated that the SBIRS program will be delayed by 15 months
and cost $414 million to resolve the software problems, those estimates appear
too optimistic, given the cost and schedule risks involved. For example, SBIRS
contractors‘ report low confidence that software can be produced in time to meet
the December 2009 satellite launch goal. Further, DOD and the contractor face
significant challenges and risks that could result in more time and money being
required to meet program goals, to include the bypassing of some disciplined
software practices that add risk to cost and schedule. Finally, as of August 2008,
DOD reported that SBIRS was already behind schedule on some software
development efforts, and thousands of activities remain that must be integrated
and tested across various systems, with cost and schedule implications, if
problems or unintended consequences occur.
The GAO‘s annual assessment of selected programs revealed a higher level of
technical maturity for SBIRS High, but still maintained concerns about the ability of the
program to adhere to its cost and schedule (Government Accountability Office, 2010):
The SBIRS High program began system development in 1996 with none of its
three critical technologies mature. All three critical technologies—the infrared
sensor, thermal management, and on-board processing—are now mature and have
been demonstrated in at least a relevant environment. Furthermore, according to
the program office, the HEO sensor‘s on-orbit performance instills confidence
that the GEO infrared scanning sensor will work as intended.
According to program officials, 99 percent of the SBIRS High expected design
drawings are now releasable. However, the program continues to experience
design-related problems, and more could emerge. For example, flight software
design problems have plagued the program for several years, causing cost
increases and schedule delays, and the program may still be underestimating the
amount of work that remains to resolve the issues.
According to the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), unplanned
work continues to be a challenge for the software development effort and its cost
and schedule have been assessed as high risk.
The SBIRS High program remains at high risk for cost and schedule growth.
DCMA is currently projecting over $245 million in cost overrun from the current
baseline at contract completion. This amount has more than doubled in the past
year and continues to steadily grow.
Additional contractor cost increases and schedule delays are expected due in part
to hardware rework on the first satellite, continued difficulty with the flight
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software development, and delays in integration and test activities. The program‘s
management reserve— funds set aside to address unanticipated problems— will
likely be depleted before the first GEO satellite launches, and additional funding
could be required if future problems occur. Additional schedule delays could also
occur since meeting current launch estimates depends on the results of systemlevel integration tests.
According to the program office, the first GEO integrated payload and spacecraft
successfully completed thermal vacuum (TVAC) testing in November 2009.
Program officials say these testing results give them high confidence that the
GEO satellite will perform similarly to the successful HEO sensors, noting that
HEO TVAC test performance differed only slightly from its on-orbit
performance.
Program officials say that although technical issues discovered during testing
have increased program cost, parallel activities have actually minimized program
cost and schedule growth. They further stressed that mission assurance remains
their top priority.
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Appendix B – Space Acquisition Cost and Schedule Challenges

Figure 8. Space Program Cost Growth (Government Accountability Office, 2010)
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Figure 9. Space Program Unit Cost Growth (Government Accountability Office,
2010)
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Figure 10. Space Program Schedule Delays (Government Accountability Office,
2010)
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Appendix C – A Summary of Space Acquisition Findings and Root Causes
Table 35. Space Acquisition Lessons Learned
System or
Subject

Failure // Root Cause

Year

Source

AEHF

early phases of the AEHF program, DOD
substantially and frequently altered requirements;
DOD decided to accelerate its plans to build the
AEHF satellites, high risk schedule that turned out to
be overly optimistic and highly compressed-leaving
little room for error; did not have the funding needed
to support the activities and the manpower needed to
design and build the satellites quicker
DOD has been slow to plan for this initiative and it
has not addressed important questions such as how
and when systems will be pared down and modified
as well as how the initiative will be funded.
Moreover, DOD is fielding new systems and new
versions of old systems without following its own
certification process
incompatible data formats, process for testing and
certifying that systems will be interoperable is not
working effectively // lack of an overarching test
plan

2003

GAO - Military Space
Operations: Common
Problems and Their
Effects on Satellite and
Related Acquisitions

2003

GAO - Steps Needed
to Ensure
Interoperability of
Systems That Process
Intelligence Data

2003

GAO - Steps Needed
to Ensure
Interoperability of
Systems That Process
Intelligence Data

establish realistic cost and schedule estimates

2006

ensure sufficient technical readiness of the system‘s
components prior to key decisions // GOES I-M
series, NOAA and NASA did not require
engineering analyses prior to awarding the
development contracts in order to
accelerate the schedule and launch the first satellite.
The lack of these studies resulted in unexpected
technical issues in later acquisition phases—
including the inability of the original instrument
designs to withstand the temperature variations in the
geostationary orbit

2006

GAO - Steps Remain
in Incorporating
Lessons Learned from
Other Satellite
Programs
GAO - Steps Remain
in Incorporating
Lessons Learned from
Other Satellite
Programs

Distributed
Common
GroundSurface
System
(DCGS)
Distributed
Common
GroundSurface
System
(DCGS)
GOES,
lessons
learned
incorporation
GOES,
lessons
learned
incorporation
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GOES,
lessons
learned
incorporation

GOES,
lessons
learned
incorporation
GOES-R risks

GOES-R risks

Incentives &
Pressures

Incentives &
Pressures

provide sufficient management at government and
contractor levels // The key drivers of poor
management included inadequate systems
engineering and earned value management
capabilities, unsuitable allocation of contract award
fees, inadequate levels of management reserve, and
inefficient decision-making and reporting structure
within the program office
perform adequate senior executive oversight to
ensure mission success // lack of timely decisions
and regular involvement of senior executive
management was a critical factor in the program‘s
rapid cost and schedule growth
hardware that is to be used for the ground segment is
mature, key components have not previously been
integrated. Consequently, if the components do not
work together, the program might have to procure
separate antennas, which would impact the
program‘s cost and schedule
Advanced Baseline Imager estimates that the
instrument is over 50 percent complete and reports
that it has experienced technical issues, including
problems with the quality of components in the focal
plane module, mirrors, and telescope. none has yet
been demonstrated in a lab or test environment, the
risk remains that the technologies are not sufficiently
mature
lack of an overall investment strategy; tendency to
set start dates for programs before a sound business
case for them has been established; DOD starts more
programs than it can afford and rarely prioritizes
them for funding purposes; Such an approach has
cascading effects—from creating negative behaviors
associated with competing for funds, to increasing
technology challenges, to creating unanticipated and
disruptive funding shifts, to stretching out schedules
in order to accommodate the whole portfolio of
space programs
• DOD starts more programs than it can afford over
the long run, forcing programs to underestimate costs
and overpromise capability. This was attributed to
both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Air Force. The September 11, 2001, terror attacks on
the United States spurred DOD to attempt to pursue
even more satellite programs, believing that there
was now a greater need for persistent surveillance
and more robust communication and networking
capabilities.
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Incentives &
Pressures

• When faced with a lower budget, senior executives
within Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air
Force would rather make across-the board cuts to all
space programs than hard decisions as to which ones
to keep and which ones to cancel or cut back.

2005

Incentives &
Pressures

• Because programs are funded annually and
priorities have not been established, competition for
funding continues over time, forcing programs to
view success as the ability to secure the next
installment rather than the end goal of delivering
capabilities when and as promised.
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Incentives &
Pressures

• More often than not, DOD seeks substantial leaps
in capability versus incremental leaps. While this
approach helps a program to gain support, it
substantially increases the technical challenge and
the level of unknowns about a program at the time it
is started.
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Incentives &
Pressures

• Having to continually ―
sell‖ a program also creates
incentives to suppress bad news about the program‘s
status and avoid activities that uncover bad news.

2005

Incentives &
Pressures

• Launching demonstrators in space is a good way to
reduce risks and learn about technologies before
starting a new acquisition program. But because of
the high cost of testing technologies in space and the
overall competition for funding, programs are
incentivized not to pursue this approach. At the same
time, resources outside acquisition programs devoted
to testing in an operational environment are
declining.
• DOD faces resource shortages beyond funding
because it starts more programs than it can afford.
Principally, it does not have a sufficient workforce to
support space acquisitions or experienced program
managers to guide them.

2005

diverse array of officials and organizations involved
with the acquisition process, tensions between the
S&T and acquisition communities as to who is better
suited to translate technology concepts into reality
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• The lengthy development period required for space
systems puts pressure on program managers to
continually develop technologies. There is a fear that
if these technologies do not reach maturity during
this time frame, they will be outdated by the time the
satellites are ready to be launched.

2005

Incentives &
Pressures

• Once a program has formally begun, it is easier to
secure current and future years‘ funding.

2005

Incentives &
Pressures

• Satellites tend to last longer than expected, and they
cannot be retrieved for upgrades, putting more
pressure on programs to push for attaining as much
technological capability as possible within the
acquisition program.

2005

Incentives &
Pressures

• The acquisition community does not believe that
labs in charge of developing space technologies
adequately understand its needs—in terms of
capabilities and time frames—and would rather
pursue its own goals.

2005

Incentives &
Pressures

• Program managers also believe that they would
have more control over technology development if it
was conducted by contractors who answered to them
rather than to DOD labs.

2005

Incentives &
Pressures

• DOD has not had an effective strategy for steering
activities within the S&T community to ensure that
they will eventually fit in with acquisition needs.
(Note: DOD has recently developed a space S&T
strategy. We reported on this effort in January 2005.)

2005

Incentives &
Pressures

pressures resulting from short tenures among staff
critical to achieving acquisition success, and
difficulties in overseeing contractors

2005
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• Nonincumbent contractors are often able to submit
a lower price than the incumbent because they can be
optimistic without being challenged by DOD. These
optimistic estimates enable them to win new
contracts. At the same time, however,
nonincumbents are not necessarily the best
organizations to carry out the development program,
particularly because they do not have the technical
and management experience associated with the
legacy system being replaced.
• Industry has been consolidated to a point where
there may be only one company that can develop a
needed component for a satellite system. This has
enabled contractors to hold some programs hostage.
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Incentives &
Pressures

• Program managers are often not equipped to
understand what is behind a contractor‘s proposal,
particularly because contractors are not likely to
disclose technical risks and highlight other negative
aspects.

2005

Incentives &
Pressures

• Industry puts pressure on programs to have
contractors develop critical technologies within an
acquisition environment versus having the labs do it.
When labs build technologies, the government
allows the contractors that work on the system that
would ultimately use the technologies to scrap them
in favor of employing their own methods and
expertise.
• Program managers are not always experienced
enough to stand up to contractors when development
is being mismanaged. Program managers also may
not understand the best ways to incentivize
contractors and gain insight into their performance.

2005

GAO - Defense
Acquisitions:
Incentives and
Pressures That Drive
Problems Affecting
Satellite and Related
Acquisitions
GAO - Defense
Acquisitions:
Incentives and
Pressures That Drive
Problems Affecting
Satellite and Related
Acquisitions
GAO - Defense
Acquisitions:
Incentives and
Pressures That Drive
Problems Affecting
Satellite and Related
Acquisitions

• Contractors are facing workforce pressures similar
to those experienced by the government, that is, not
enough technical expertise to develop highly
complex space systems. (Our recent report on space
S&T echoed this concern as well, pointing out that
several studies have found that both industry and the
U.S. government face substantial shortages of
scientists and engineers and that recruitment of new
personnel is difficult because the space industry is
one of many sectors competing for the limited
number of trained scientists and engineers.)
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• Some space programs are facing pressures related
to funding and technology development because of
an expectation widely held in the 1990s that the
commercial space market would experience a boom.
At the time, DOD decreased funding for some
capabilities, principally space launch, assuming the
market could pay for a portion of research and
development and that economies of scale would
result. It also relied on the commercial sector to
develop knowledge about production of satellites
that eventually were purchased as part of the
Wideband Gapfiller Satellite program. However,
when anticipated commercial orders using the same
technologies did not pan out, the government
experienced unanticipated schedule delays.
requirements setting problems attributable to the
broad base of internal customers each agency has
and the diversity of requirements that needed to be
met
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2003

NPOESS is being managed with cost as the most
important parameter: One observation of this cost
priority is reflected in the award fee structure and its
emphasis on cost control. Successful space
acquisition requires mission success to be the top
priority not cost as the overarching factor
The EXCOM process is ineffective: The EXCOM is
intended to be a decision body to provide
streamlined direction to the PEO. The current DOD
EXCOM representative has not been delegated the
proper authority from the Defense Acquisition
Executive (DAE), who is also the NPOESS
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), and decisions
require an additional meeting and coordination to be
finalized
The PEO and IPO do not have sufficient space
systems acquisition expertise and processes: The
NPOESS program is not part of a supporting space
systems acquisition center, such as the AF Space and
Missile Systems Center (SMC) or the NASA
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). These types
of established space acquisition organizations can
provide institutional knowledge, robust infrastructure
support, and a cadre of seasoned space systems
acquisition experts
Funding shortfalls are causing the IPO to make
short-sighted decisions to cover VIIRS cost growth
and stay within allocated budget at a significant
increase to outyear costs and program risks: While
the IPO has no choice but to make these decisions,
risk is being deliberately built into the program to
stay within allocated budget.
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The priorities of NOAA, NASA and DOD/USAF are
not aligned: The DOD has stated that while the
program should continue to pursue the current
NPOESS requirements, the DOD is willing to accept
legacy performance (DMSP and POES) to maintain
continuity, cost and schedule goals and is not willing
to provide additional funding to pursue requirements
beyond legacy. NOAA states that legacy
performance would be a step back in today‘s
performance because of their current operational use
of NASA research satellites that are well beyond
their design life
The current budget is inadequate: Budgeting to a 5050 cost estimate leads to insufficient funding. It lacks
sufficient management reserve, and as noted in
Finding #6, this leads to programs using risk as its
management reserve. The current budget is not at the
50/50 level. The most probable cost is at the 80/20
level including reserves

2009

NPOESS Independent
Review Team

2009

NPOESS Independent
Review Team

Committee lacks the membership and leadership
needed to effectively and efficiently oversee and
direct the program. Specifically, the DOD
Committee member with acquisition authority does
not attend Executive Committee meetings—and
sometimes contradicts the Committee‘s decisions,
the Committee does not track its action items to
closure, and many of the Committee‘s decisions do
not achieve desired outcomes // DOD‘s acquisition
authority has never attended an Executive
Committee meeting. This individual delegated the
responsibility for attending the meetings—but not
the authority to make acquisition decisions—to the
Under Secretary of the Air Force // agreements
between committee members have been overturned
by the acquisition authority, leading to significant
delays // NPOESS Executive Committee generally
took immediate action to mitigate the risks that were
brought before them; however, a majority of these
actions were not effective—that is, they did not fully
resolve the underlying issues or result in a successful
outcome // interagency disagreements and differing
priorities
Specifically, ongoing challenges with VIIRS
development, design, and workmanship have led to
additional cost overruns and delayed the instrument‘s
delivery to NPP
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NPOESS

problems discovered during environmental testing on
CrIS led the contractor to further delay its delivery to
NPP and added further unanticipated costs to the
program

2009

NPOESS risks

Progress Has Been Made in Establishing an Effective
NPOESS Management Structure, but Executive
Turnover Increases Risks and Staffing Problems
Remain

2007

NPOESS risks

Space Segment—Progress Made, but Key Sensors
Continue to Face Major Risks // VIIRS - completed
environmental tests of VIIRS‘s engineering design
unit (a prototype) (1) band-to-band co-registration,
an issue in which band registration shifts with
different temperatures; (2) cross-talk, which involves
information from sensor cells leaking into other
cells; and (3) line-spread function issues, in which
the instrument‘s focus changes with changes in
temperature, CrIS - Development of CrIS was put on
hold in October 2006 when the flight unit designated
to go on NPP experienced a major structural failure
during its vibration test
program‘s history of moving forward without
sufficient knowledge to ensure that the product
design is stable and meets performance requirements
and that adequate resources are available

2007

program passed its critical design review with only
50 percent of its design drawings completed,
compared to 90 percent as recommended by best
practices. Consequently, several design
modifications were necessary, including 39 to the
first of two infrared sensors to reduce excessive
noise created by electromagnetic interference—a
threat to the host satellite‘s functionality—delaying
delivery of the sensor by 10 months or more
testing of the first infrared sensor revealed several
deficiencies in the flight software involving the
sensor‘s ability to maintain earth coverage and track
missiles while orbiting the earth (flight software still
major program risk)

2003

The program was too immature to enter the system
design and development phase. Program activation
was based on faulty and overly optimistic
assumptions about software reuse and productivity
levels, the benefits of commercial practices,
management stability, and the level of understanding

2003

SBIRS

SBIRS

SBIRS

SBIRS

90

2003

2003

GAO - With Costs
Increasing and Data
Continuity at Risk,
Improvements Needed
in Tri-agency Decision
Making
GAO ENVIRONMENTAL
SATELLITE
ACQUISITIONS
Progress and
Challenges
GAO ENVIRONMENTAL
SATELLITE
ACQUISITIONS
Progress and
Challenges

GAO - Despite
Restructuring, SBIRS
High Program
Remains at Risk of
Cost and Schedule
Overruns
GAO - Despite
Restructuring, SBIRS
High Program
Remains at Risk of
Cost and Schedule
Overruns

GAO - Despite
Restructuring, SBIRS
High Program
Remains at Risk of
Cost and Schedule
Overruns
GAO - Despite
Restructuring, SBIRS
High Program
Remains at Risk of
Cost and Schedule
Overruns

of requirements.

SBIRS

SBIRS

SBIRS

SBIRS

SBIRS

The complexity of developing engineering solutions
to meet system requirements was not well
understood by program and contracting officials. The
systems integration effort was significantly
underestimated in terms of complexity and the
associated impacts. In addition, the requirements
refinement process was ad hoc, creating uncertainty
on the status of program priorities and affecting cost
and schedule.
Breakdown in execution and management. Overly
optimistic assumptions and unclear requirements
eventually overwhelmed government and contractor
management. The 2-year delay of the GEO satellite
launches, which occurred in 1998, contributed to
management instability and was a factor in the
Program Office and the contractor having to spend
25 of the first 60 months of the contract on
replanning activities.
latent defects, resulting from insufficient product
assurance activity in earlier design and production
activities // lack of sound system engineering
processes and procedures
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insufficient schedule and budget to ensure robust
GEO first article integration / test // insufficient time
scheduled for GEO system integration and test; SPO
concluded the ground software productivity levels
were optimistic; the flight software architecture was
not sufficiently defined to allow software coding;
and inadequate on-orbit checkout time was planned.
Finally, the resources and tools for simulations,
analysis, and troubleshooting were inadequate and
required more effort
process escapes due to human error / insufficient
training / fragile processes // improper or inadequate
processes, insufficient training, questionable
inspection practices, and/or human error as causal
factors. Recent events include excess debris or
contamination in delivered hardware, improper use
of soldering materials, improper installation of
thermal blankets, and missing test procedure
documentation
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SBIRS

A poor design and build implementation to comply
with the EMI specifications of the HEO P/L // flawed
design approach

2005

SBIRS

Faulty hardware and software design of the
HEO/GEO flight computers, i.e., the single board
computer ‗halt‘ anomalies // hardware design
problem with a control signal on an ApplicationSpecific Integrated Circuit (ASIC)

2005

SBIRS

An inadequate architecture design and a flawed flight
software development plan for the GEO satellite‘s
Signal Processing Assembly (SPA) // state of the
software architecture, a very aggressive contractor
schedule, and inadequate planning

2005

SBIRS

flight software for the first satellite underwent testing
and failed; timing of stored programs // test beds that
had matured in parallel with the flight software and
hardware, making it difficult to distinguish between
test bed and software issues; oversubscription of test
beds and lack of simulation resources that precluded
them from checking out high-risk areas (timing, and
stored programs); insufficient modeling of timing,
and analysis of stored program implementation,
which might have shed light earlier on lack of
robustness
flight software for the first satellite underwent testing
and failed; distribution of control between processors
// test beds that had matured in parallel with the
flight software and hardware, making it difficult to
distinguish between test bed and software issues;
oversubscription of test beds and lack of simulation
resources that precluded them from checking out
high-risk areas (timing, and stored programs);
insufficient modeling of timing, and analysis of
stored program implementation, which might have
shed light earlier on lack of robustness
flight software for the first satellite underwent testing
and failed; failure at the hardware interface level // //
test beds that had matured in parallel with the flight
software and hardware, making it difficult to
distinguish between test bed and software issues;
oversubscription of test beds and lack of simulation
resources that precluded them from checking out
high-risk areas (timing, and stored programs);
insufficient modeling of timing, and analysis of
stored program implementation, which might have
shed light earlier on lack of robustness
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weaknesses in management responsibility,
accountability and organizational structure; Air
Force has limited management control over SBIRS
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Lockheed Martin‘s program process discipline is
poor
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Adversarial relationships exist between Air Force
and Lockheed Martin
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Government organizational structure is flawed
because cost and schedule responsibilities are
separated
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Focal point for FSS completion is needed
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SBIRS

reasons for the delay include poor government
oversight of the contractor, technical complexities,
and rework. The program continues to struggle with
flight software development, and during testing last
year, officials discovered hardware defects on the
first GEO satellite, though the program reports that
they have been resolved
• Cost-driven,
• Underfunded,
• Optimistic contractor proposal,
• Uncontrolled requirements,
• Limited program manager authority and capability,
• Funding instability (four replans),
• Program manager instability (four government and
four industry program
managers), and
• Failure to implement ―
best practices.‖
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independent review team chartered by DOD to
examine the reasons behind cost and scheduling
problems in the SBIRS-High program reported that a
key root cause was that system requirements were
not well-understood when the program began and as
it evolved; requirements setting process was often
adhoc with many decisions being deferred to the
contractor. The review team also found that the
program was too immature to enter system design
and development. Further, there was too much
instability on the program after the contract award
• Knowledge point 1: A match must be made
between the customer‘s requirements and the
developer‘s available resources before product
development starts. As noted earlier, DOD plans to
start SBR product development in 2006.
• Knowledge point 2: The product‘s design must be
stable and must meet performance requirements
before initial manufacturing begins.
• Knowledge point 3: The product must be
producible within cost, schedule, and quality targets
and demonstrated to be reliable before production
begins.
A defined requirements approval process helps
decision makers resolve disagreements that may
occur and ensure they will remain committed to
their decisions after formal approval. Based on our
past reports on uncovering problems and our best
practice work, we believe that the steps in a formal
approval process include:
• explaining how decision makers‘ requirements and
comments are obtained and addressed;
• identifying the officials and/or the organizations
responsible for taking specific approval action;
• establishing a mechanism and time frame for
providing approval or disapproval;
• establishing a system for addressing unresolved
issues as they relate to key program documentation;
and
• assessing changes to approved requirements based
on their effect on the program‘s cost and schedule.
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it is expected that some critical SBR technologies
will not be mature when product development starts,
that is, not tested in a relevant or operational
environment. Typical outcomes of this lack of
knowledge are significant cost and schedule
increases because of the need to fix problems later in
development. Furthermore, TCA, a new, more robust
communications infrastructure that could transmit
SBR‘s imagery data much more quickly than the
current infrastructure, is facing uncertainties.
Specifically, one of TCA‘s primary components, the
Transformational Satellite, may not be ready in time
to support SBR. However, if DOD begins product
development with less than mature technologies and
without knowing the availability of TCA, accurate
cost estimates for SBR will be much more difficult to
prepare
requirements definition and control issues
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Space,
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Problems

Cost has replaced mission success as the primary
driver in managing acquisition processes, resulting in
excessive technical and schedule risk

2003

Space,
Common
Problems

overall underappreciation of the importance of
appropriately staffed and trained system engineering
staffs to manage the technologically demanding and
unique aspects of space programs; Government
capabilities to lead and manage the acquisition
process have seriously eroded
The space acquisition system is strongly biased to
produce unrealistically low cost estimates throughout
the acquisition process. These estimates lead to
unrealistic budgets and unexecutable programs;
widespread lack of budget reserves required to
implement high risk programs on schedule;
unhealthy cost bias in proposal evaluation //
government typically has invested significantly in
capital and intellectual resources for the incumbent.
When the incumbent loses, both capital resources
and the mature engineering and management
capability are lost. A similar investment must be
made in the new contractor team. The government
pays for purchase and installation of specialized
equipment, as well as fit-out of manufacturing and
assembly spaces that are tailored to meet the needs of
the program
While the space industrial base is adequate to
support current programs, long-term concerns exist;
Industry has failed to implement proven practices on
some programs
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requirements for what the satellite needed to do and
how well it must perform were not adequately
defined at the beginning of a program or were
changed significantly once the program had already
begun. This made it more difficult for programs to
ensure that they could match their requirements to
their resources (in terms of money, time, and
technology). The more requirements were added or
changed, the more that cost and schedule increased
• Program did not adequately define requirements
• Unresolved conflicts among users on requirements
• Frequent changes made to requirements after
product development began
// schedule-driven versus a knowledge-driven
approach; diverse array of organizations with
competing interests involved in overall satellite
development, no high-level official within the Office
of the Secretary of Defense dedicated to developing
and implementing an overall investment strategy for
space; attempted to satisfy all requirements in a
single step, regardless of the design challenge or the
maturity of technologies to achieve the full capability
investment practices were weak. At times, programs
did not explore potentially more cost-effective
investment approaches. Once they settled on an
approach, programs often did not develop realistic
cost estimates. From a broader perspective,
investments in programs were not made in
accordance with an overall space investment strategy
for DOD. Funds were sometimes shifted from
healthier programs to pay for weaker ones. Further,
according to DOD officials, decisions external to the
program office were sometimes imposed that
resulted in unexpected funding cuts
• Program did not adequately analyze investment
alternatives
• Cost and/or schedule estimates were optimistic
• Funding was unstable
// schedule-driven versus a knowledge-driven
approach; diverse array of organizations with
competing interests involved in overall satellite
development, no high-level official within the Office
of the Secretary of Defense dedicated to developing
and implementing an overall investment strategy for
space
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acquisition strategies were poorly executed. For
example, competition was reduced for the sake of
schedule or DOD did not adequately oversee
contractors. At times, contract type was not suitable
for the work being done
• Level of competition was reduced or eliminated
• Contract type was not suitable for work being done
• Poor oversight over contractors
// schedule-driven versus a knowledge-driven
approach
programs did not always ensure that technologies
were mature before making heavy investments in the
program. This often caused cost and schedule
increases due to the need to fix problems later in
development. A continuing problem is that software
needs are poorly understood at the beginning of a
program
• Technology not sufficiently mature at program start
• Software needs poorly understood
• Testing compressed, skipped, or done concurrently
with production
// schedule-driven versus a knowledge-driven
approach; attempted to satisfy all requirements in a
single step, regardless of the design challenge or the
maturity of technologies to achieve the full capability
There are insufficient numbers of technically
competent and experienced space acquisition
personnel to execute the responsibilities of the Space
and Missile Systems Center (SMC) and the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) // The reduced
availability of government personnel with the
necessary technical competence has sharply reduced
the government‘s capability to acquire space systems
and is believed by many experts to be a major cause
of acquisition program failures
Lax requirements discipline, technical performance
problems, cost growth, and schedule delays have
plagued U.S. space programs // existing leadership
and management practices have failed to define,
fund, and execute new satellite programs. Strong
management is needed to implement proven
acquisition practices
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Operations: Common
Problems and Their
Effects on Satellite and
Related Acquisitions

2003

GAO - Military Space
Operations: Common
Problems and Their
Effects on Satellite and
Related Acquisitions

2008

Institute for Defense
Analyses - Leadership,
Management, and
Organization for
National Security
Space

2008

Institute for Defense
Analyses - Leadership,
Management, and
Organization for
National Security
Space

Space,
Common
Problems

TSAT

leadership for National Security Space is currently
fragmented and unfocused. Authorities and
responsibilities are spread across numerous
organizations, including many within the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) [Under Secretary of
Defense (USD)/Intelligence; USD/Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics; USD/Policy; and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD)/Networks &
Information Integration], USAF, USN, USA, USMC,
DARPA, MDA, and NRO. Although the Secretary of
the Air Force is the DOD Executive Agent for Space,
its authorities have been diminished from those
envisioned by the 2001 Space Commission.
Moreover, as perceived by many, its stewardship of
Space does not enjoy the same priority as other
traditional Air Force missions. The customers who
use Space capabilities observe that there is no
responsible official who looks across all the available
resources and capabilities to seek the best solution,
whether from the military, intelligence, civilian, or
commercial sector. This represents a critical need
When DOD established initial goals for the TSAT
program, it lacked sufficient knowledge about key
critical technologies. Our past work has shown that a
knowledge-based model leads to better acquisition
outcomes. This model can be broken down into three
cumulative knowledge points for technology
maturity, design maturity, and production maturity.
At the first knowledge point, a match is made
between a customer‘s requirements and the product
developer‘s available resources in terms of technical
knowledge, time, money, and capacity. We have also
reported that starting a complex program like TSAT
with immature technologies can lead to poor
program performance and outcomes.

2008

Institute for Defense
Analyses - Leadership,
Management, and
Organization for
National Security
Space

2006

GAO - SPACE
ACQUISITIONS
DOD Needs
Additional Knowledge
as it Embarks on a
New Approach for
Transformational
Satellite

The table above contains text from the following sources: (Government Accountability Office, 2010)
(Government Accountability Office, 2003) (Government Accountability Office, 2004) (Government
Accountability Office, 2003) (Government Accountability Office, 2005) (Government Accountability
Office, 2007) (Government Accountability Office, 2009) (Government Accountability Office, 2006)
(Government Accountability Office, 2003) (Government Accountability Office, 2009) (Government
Accountability Office, 2006) (Government Accountability Office, 2008) (Institute for Defense Analyses,
2008) (NPOESS Independent Review Team, 2009) (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003)
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Appendix D – Recommendations for Space Acquisition Improvement
The 2003 Defense Science Board report laid out a number of steps necessary to
correct the space acquisition deficiencies previously discussed. The combination of
space acquisition lessons learned and recommendations for improvement were used to
compose the maturity model. The report cited the following steps (Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2003):
1. The Under Secretary of the Air Force/Director National Reconnaissance Office
(USecAF/DNRO) should establish mission success as the guiding principle in all
space systems acquisition. This requires incorporation of the principle in policy
statements, leadership actions, and contractual provisions and incentives.
2. The SecDef should establish the same authority for the USecAF for DOD space
programs as the DNRO has for implementing the National Reconnaissance
Program (NRP) budget.
3. To ensure realistic budgets and cost estimates, the USecAF/DNRO should
• Direct that space acquisition programs be budgeted to a most probable
(80/20) cost, with a 20-25 percent management reserve for development
programs included within this cost; also direct that reserves are not to be
used for new requirements;
• Direct that source selections evaluate contractor cost credibility and use
the estimate as a measure of their technical understanding;
• Conduct more effective independent cost estimates and program
assessments and incorporate the results into the program budget and plan;
• Implement independent senior advisory reviews at critical acquisition
milestones with experienced, respected outsiders.
4. The USecAF/DNRO should compete space system acquisitions only when
clearly in the best interest of the government (e.g., new mission capability, major
new technology, or poor incumbent performance). When a competition occurs
and a nonincumbent is the winner, the loss of investment in the losing incumbent
must be reflected in the program budget and plan. In addition, provisions must be
made to assure continuity between the legacy system and the new system.
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5. SecDef and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) should designate senior
leaders in the DOD and intelligence community with authority to lead their
respective requirements processes for national security space systems. The senior
leaders must have the support necessary to assess—technically and fiscally—
proposed requirements and the authority to couple requirements with funding.
6. The USecAF/DNRO should authorize the program manager to control
requirements within the approved baseline. The program manager should
continuously trade and challenge requirements throughout the program life cycle.
Significant requirements changes should require the approval of the senior leaders
for requirements.
7. The Commander, Air Force Space Command, should complete the ongoing
effort to establish a dedicated career field for space operations and acquisition
personnel.
8. The USecAF/DNRO should require that key program management tours be a
minimum of 4 years.
9. The USecAF/DNRO should, through policy and leadership action, clearly
define the responsibility, authority, and accountability for program managers,
recognizing the criticality of program managers to the success of their programs.
In selecting managers, acquisition experience must be a prerequisite.
10. USecAF/DNRO should develop a robust systems engineering capability to
support program initiation and development. Specifically, USecAF/DNRO should
• Reestablish organic government systems engineering capability by
selecting appropriate people from within government, hiring to acquire
needed capabilities, and implementing training programs; and
• In the near term, ensure full utilization of the combined capabilities of
government, Federally Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC), and systems engineering and technical assistance (SETA)
system engineering resources.
11. The USecAF/DNRO should require program managers to identify and report
potential problems early.
• Program managers should establish early warning metrics and report
problems up the management chain for timely corrective action.
• Severe and prominent penalties should follow any attempt to suppress
problem reporting.
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12. The USecAF/DNRO should demand that national security space contractors
• Account for the quality of their program implementation and for mission
success,
• Identify proven management and engineering practices and ensure they
are being utilized, and
• Account for the early identification and open discussion of problems in
their program.
13. Program managers should align contract and fee structure to focus industry
attention on proven management and engineering practices and mission success.
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Appendix E – Excerpts from the Systems Engineering Leading Indicators Guide
Table 36. Systems Engineering Leading Indicators Overview (Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, INCOSE, and PSM, 2010)
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Table 37. Leading Indicator Specification Example (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, INCOSE, and PSM, 2010)
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Appendix F – SAIMM Interoperability Measurement Checklist
Step 1 – Determine Program Interoperation Maturity
Assess the subject program‘s interoperation maturity for the cost, schedule and
requirements areas using the SAIMM matrix provided in Chapter III (SAIMM link). The
program may tailor the matrix based upon their historical precedent and lessons learned.
Step 2 – Instantiate the Program Character States
Place the respective SAIMM scores for each area and attribute into a spreadsheet
or similar tool. The following format was used to perform the calculations in this thesis:
Table 38. Instantiation Example Format
Program X

Mission Focus

Stability

Discipline

Cost

1

1

1

Realism
1

Schedule

1

1

1

1

Requirements

1

1

1

1

Step 3 – Perform the Interoperability Measurement
Apply the SimReal function to the instantiation matrix to perform the
interoperability measurement. Set r to 2, and n and cmax to 4.
Step 4 – Evaluate the Results
Examine the resulting interoperability scores. The program may use the AEHF,
NPOESS and SBIRS examples in this thesis for comparison. The program may also
perform the measurement during various phases in the program to evaluate progress.
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